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作 者:王婷 赵梁佛 杨金朋 张丹丹 雷震[2,4] WANG Ting;ZHAO Liangfo;YANG Jinpeng;ZHANG Dandan;LEI Zhen(Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China;China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China;Institute of Brain and Psychological Sciences,Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610066,China;School of Economics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
机构地区:[1]四川大学商学院,成都610065 [2]西南财经大学中国行为经济与行为金融研究中心,成都611130 [3]四川师范大学脑与心理科学研究院,成都610066 [4]西南财经大学经济学院,成都611130
出 处:《心理学报》2024年第12期1788-1799,共12页Acta Psychologica Sinica
基 金:四川大学专职博士后研究基金(skbsh2024-51);国家自然科学基金重点项目(72033006);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(SXYPY202355)资助
摘 要:上行间接互惠是推动人类大规模合作与社会秩序扩展的重要力量。现有文献存在两点不足:一是忽略了上行间接互惠中人们到底是以什么作为评判善意与非善意的基准;二是大部分上行间接互惠文献未意识到“收入效应”这一竞争性假说。本文假设:当人们得到高于社会均值的分配时,真人分配条件下给第三方的金额会高于社会均值,且比电脑分配条件下给第三方的金额更高;当人们得到低于社会均值的分配时,真人分配条件下给第三方的金额会低于社会均值,且比电脑分配条件下给第三方的金额更低。研究采用两阶段独裁者博弈范式。行为和ERP结果均较好支持了本研究的假设。真人分配比电脑分配诱发更大的N1波幅;低于社会均值的分配比高于社会均值的分配诱发更大的FRN;在真人条件下,接受低于社会均值的分配比高于社会均值的分配结果诱发更大的P3波幅。本结果支持了基于社会分配均值的上行间接互惠假说,为该研究领域提供了新的理论基础和实验证据。Upstream indirect reciprocity,a widespread phenomenon observed both in real-world settings and controlled experimental environments,extends beyond conventional reciprocity systems and plays a crucial role in fostering large-scale human cooperation and maintaining social order.Although this social phenomenon has garnered significant scholarly attention,existing research remains insufficient in uncovering its underlying mechanisms.Previous studies typically use a two-stage dictator game to investigate upstream indirect reciprocity.According to meta-analyses of experimental literature on dictator games,dictators typically allocated 28%of the total to recipients,with allocations exceeding 50%being extremely rare(Engel,2011).Surprisingly,most existing research considers equal distribution(where A allocates 50%to B)as the threshold for determining whether A has good intentions,despite lacking sufficient justification for this criterion.Different from prior work,we propose that individuals assess others’intentions relative to the social mean as a reference point.Based on this premise,we hypothesize that when individuals receive an allocation above the social mean,they are more likely to pass on a value above the mean to third parties,whereas allocations below the mean will result in values passed below the mean.If individuals indeed pass on a higher or lower value based on whether they received above-or below-mean allocations,this result might also be explained by an alternative hypothesis:the income effect,where people give more when they have more resources.Therefore,this study investigates whether intention-based indirect reciprocity persists event after controlling for the income effect.We recruited 42 undergraduate participants for the experiment,which consists of two parts:a standard dictator game followed by an indirect reciprocity experiment.The second experiment employed a 2(distribution below the social mean vs.above the social mean)×2(human allocation vs.computer allocation)within-subject design.The main e
分 类 号:B845[哲学宗教—心理学] R395[医药卫生—医学心理学]
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