基于Hotelling模型的中欧班列运营商竞合策略演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary game study of China Railway Express operators’competition and cooperation strategy based on Hotelling model

作　　者：赵鲁华 邢惠尧 武光娜 孙君静 刘岳朋 邢磊 张立业 ZHAO Luhua;XING Huiyao;WU Guangna;SUN Junjing;LIU Yuepeng;XING Lei;ZHANG Liye(College of Transportation,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266000,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学交通学院,山东青岛266000

出　　处：《铁道科学与工程学报》2024年第11期4456-4466,共11页Journal of Railway Science and Engineering

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2023QG039)。

摘　　要：随着中欧班列迅速发展,运营商之间竞争日益严重。运营商之间的竞合关系是中欧班列可持续健康发展的重要研究方向之一。针对中欧班列运营商竞合策略决策问题,利用静态Hotelling模型与动态演化博弈模型相结合的方法进行研究分析。首先运用Hotelling模型构建了完全竞争模式、部分合作模式和合作模式3种竞合关系模型,通过模型计算及仿真分析各模式的静态均衡解,得出合作模式下运营商会获得更大的利润。在此基础上构建了运营商之间的(竞争,竞争),(竞争,合作),(合作,竞争),(合作,合作)4种竞合策略的演化博弈模型,将博弈理论分析和动态演化过程分析结合起来,研究时间及收益损失、额外收益、抗风险成本、违约金等影响因素对演化博弈的影响,以及对运营商决策的影响。通过MATLAB仿真研究各影响因素对演化路径的影响。研究结果表明,当演化博弈的均衡点(p^(*),q^(*))满足(Ⅰ,Ⅲ)条件时,演化结果为(0, 0)或(1, 1),即两运营商均选择竞争或合作为最终演化稳定策略。竞合策略的演化结果及演化速度受各因素的影响。收益损失、额外收益、抗风险成本的增加会对运营商之间的合作起消极作用,违约金的增大会对运营商之间的合作起促进作用,通过改变这些参数大小,可以改变均衡点的大小,进而调节运营商的竞合策略。通过Hotelling模型及演化博弈模型的仿真分析可为运营商提供决策建议,以提高利润。With the rapid development of CHINA RAILWAY Express,the vicious competition among operators is becoming increasingly serious.The competition and cooperation between operators is one of the important research directions for the sustainable and healthy development of CHINA RAILWAY Express.This paper analyzed the competition and cooperation strategy selection of CHINA RAILWAY Express operators,using the static Hotelling model and dynamic evolutionary game model.First of all,Hotelling model was used to construct three competition and cooperation modes:complete competition mode,partial cooperation mode and cooperation mode.Through model calculation and simulation analysis of the static equilibrium solution of each mode,it was concluded that the operator will get greater profits under the cooperation mode.Then,an evolutionary game model of four kinds of competition and cooperation strategies among operators(competition,competition),(competition,cooperation),(cooperation,cooperation)was constructed.The game theory analysis and dynamic evolutionary process analysis were combined to study the influence of time,loss of revenue,additional revenue,anti-risk cost,liquidated damages and other influencing factors on the evolutionary game model and the change of operator decision.The influence of various influencing factors on the evolution path was studied by MATLAB simulation.The results show that when the equilibrium point(p^(*),q^(*))of the evolutionary game meets the conditions(Ⅰ,Ⅲ),the evolutionary result is(0,0)or(1,1).That is,both operators choose competition or cooperation as the final evolutionary stable strategy.The evolutionary results and evolutionary speed of the competition and cooperation strategy are affected by various factors.The increase of revenue loss,additional revenue and anti-risk cost will negatively affect the cooperation between operators,and the increase of liquidated damages will promote the cooperation between operators.By changing the size of these parameters,the size of the equilibrium point

关 键 词：中欧班列 竞合策略 博弈论 HOTELLING模型 演化博弈 

分 类 号：U2-9[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]