市场传言与审计师变更——信号效应视角  

Market Rumors and Auditor Change:A Signaling Effect Perspective

作　　者：崔毓佳 于帆 杨舒文 YUJIA CUI;FAN YU;SHUWEN YANG

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理学院 [2]中国出口信用保险公司,北京市西城区100033

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2024年第1期145-172,共28页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72302018)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于2003—2020年我国A股上市公司数据,考察市场传言对上市公司审计师变更决策的影响。本文发现,当市场中存在与公司相关的传言时,公司变更为高质量审计师的可能性更大,从而实现信号效应的目的。相较于正面传言和中性传言,负面传言对审计师升级变更的影响更大。横截面分析发现,公司内外部治理水平越高,市场传言越可能促使公司升级变更审计师。最后,本文探究市场传言对审计收费的影响,发现市场传言的发生会导致公司面临更高的审计费用。本文研究表明,在传言造成的外部噪声的信息冲击下,公司通过更换审计师的策略向市场释放积极信号。Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2003 to 2020,this paper examines the impact of market rumors on auditor change decisions of listed firms.This paper finds that when there are rumors related to a firm in the market,the likelihood of a firm changing to a high-quality auditor is greater,thereby achieving the purpose of signaling effect.Compared to positive and neutral rumors,negative rumors have a greater impact on auditor upgraded changes.Cross-sectional analyses find that auditor upgraded changes are more likely to occur in firms with higher levels of internal and external governance.Finally,this paper explores the impact of market rumors on audit fees and finds that the occurrence of market rumors can lead to firms facing higher audit fees.This study shows that under the impact of external noisy information caused by rumors,firms release positive signals to the market through the strategy of changing auditors.

关 键 词：市场传言 审计师变更 信号效应 审计费用 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]