Distributionally Robust Scheduling for Benefit Allocation in Regional Integrated Energy System with Multiple Stakeholders  

作　　者：Qinglin Meng Xiaolong Jin Fengzhang Luo Zhongguan Wang Sheharyar Hussain 

机构地区：[1]the Comprehensive Service Center,State Grid Tianjin Electric Power Company,Tianjin 300010,China [2]the Key Laboratory of Smart Grid of Ministry of Education,School of Electrical and Information Engineering,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China [3]the School of Electrical Engineering,Tiangong University,Tianjin 300387,China [4]the Key Laboratory of Smart Energy&Information Technology of Tianjin Municipality,Tianjin 300072,China [5]the Institute of Marine Electronic and Intelligent System,Ocean College,Zhejiang University,Zhoushan,China

出　　处：《Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy》2024年第5期1631-1642,共12页现代电力系统与清洁能源学报（英文）

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52207133);Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China(No.5400-202112571A-0-5-SF)。

摘　　要：A distributionally robust scheduling strategy is proposed to address the complex benefit allocation problem in regional integrated energy systems(RIESs)with multiple stakeholders.A two-level Stackelberg game model is established,with the RIES operator as the leader and the users as the followers.It considers the interests of the RIES operator and demand response users in energy trading.The leader optimizes time-of-use(TOU)energy prices to minimize costs while users formulate response plans based on prices.A two-stage distributionally robust game model with comprehensive norm constraints,which encompasses the two-level Stackelberg game model in the day-ahead scheduling stage,is constructed to manage wind power uncertainty.Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)conditions transform the two-level Stackelberg game model into a single-level robust optimization model,which is then solved using column and constraint generation(C&CG).Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy in balancing stakeholders'interests and mitigating wind power risks.

关 键 词：Regional integrated energy system(RIES) distributionally robust scheduling Stackelberg game UNCERTAINTY demand response 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] TK01[动力工程及工程热物理]