随机需求下绿色供应链成员的信用支付策略与激励机制  

Trade Credit Strategy and Incentive Mechanism of Green Supply Chain Member under Random Demand

作　　者：杨冉 YANG Ran(Suzhou Institute of Technology,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215600,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏科技大学苏州理工学院,江苏苏州215600

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第22期121-129,共9页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：2023年度镇江市社会科学应用研究课题(2023YB091)。

摘　　要：在随机需求基础上考虑一个绿色制造商与一个资金约束零售商的两级绿色供应链系统,研究制造商与第三方银行分别提供信用贷款策略时系统成员的最优决策问题,并引入惩罚机制作为激励机制,研究其对该绿色供应链系统运营效率的影响,最后通过数值算例分析单位惩罚对于最优决策以及利润的影响。结果表明,资金约束的零售商更加倾向于选择由制造商提供的信用贷款策略,并且惩罚机制的引入切实有效地提高了系统运营效率。A two-echelon green supply chain system with one green manufacturer and one capital-limited retailer was considered on the basis of random demand,then the optimal decision-making problem of the members when the manufacturer and the third-party bank respectively provided the credit loans was studied.Moreover,a punishment mechanism was introduced,and its impact on the operational efficiency of the green supply chain system was studied.Finally,the impact of unit punishment on optimal decisions and profits was analyzed through numerical examples.The research results show that the retailer with capital-limited is more inclined to choose the credit loans that provided by the manufacturer,and the introduction of the punishment mechanism has effectively improved the efficiency of system operation.

关 键 词：绿色供应链 资金约束 惩罚机制 信用支付 

分 类 号：F252.3[经济管理—国民经济]