投保农户兼业化对农业保险道德风险的影响效应及实证检验——以玉米种植保险为例  

The Effect and Empirical Test of Concurrent Farming of Insured Farmers on Moral Hazard of Agricultural Insurance—A Case Study of Maize Planting Insurance

作　　者：苑浩然 陈盛伟 牛浩 YUAN Haoran;CHEN Shengwei;NIU Hao

机构地区：[1]山东农业大学经济管理学院/商学院,泰安271018 [2]山东理工大学经济学院,淄博255000

出　　处：《世界农业》2024年第12期107-119,共13页World Agriculture

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“基于规模、结构、效率“三位一体”的我国农业保险政策优化研究”(23AGL026);山东省自然科学基金面上项目“农业保险高质量发展效率的多维测度、影响机理及提升路径研究”(ZR2023MG068)。

摘　　要：随着农户“兼业化”程度的不断提高,越来越多的农户农业经营与非农就业同时存在,兼业使农户增强收入风险分散能力的同时,容易降低其风险防范意识。基于这一问题,探究兼业对农户投保农业保险的态度及行为的影响,进而引起道德风险问题具有重要现实意义。本文一是分析投保农户发生农业保险道德风险的内在机理,并设计对应的调研问卷问题组,构建评价投保农户道德风险水平的指标体系。二是利用2021年对山东省1108户玉米种植农户的调查数据,采用Tobit模型研究兼业化对农业保险道德风险的影响效应。结果表明,兼业化对道德风险具有显著的增加效应,同时经过替换解释变量、样本缩尾处理、添加固定效应进行稳健性及内生性一系列检验发现,估计结果依然稳健。三是基于降低农业保险道德风险的目的,从兼业程度的角度提出吸引专业性劳动力返乡、改善农业资本投入结构、合理设置免赔额、提升农户保险意识以及保险公司针对性加强查勘五个方面的对策建议。With the continuous improvement of the degree of“part-time employment”of farmers,more and more farmers’agricultural management and non-agricultural employment exist simultaneously.Part-time employment can enhance the ability of income risk diversification and reduce the awareness of risk prevention.Based on this problem,it is of great practical significance to explore the change of attitude and behavior of concurrently working on agricultural insurance for farmers,and then cause the moral hazard problem.This paper first analyzes the internal mechanism of moral hazard in agricultural insurance of insured farmers,and designs the corresponding questionnaire group to construct an index system to evaluate the level of moral hazard of insured farmers.Secondly,based on the survey data of 1108 corn farmers in Shandong province in 2021,the Tobit model was used to study the effect of concurrent farming on the moral hazard of agricultural insurance.The results show that dual occupation has a significant increasing effect on moral hazard.Meanwhile,a series of robustness and endogeneity tests by replacing explanatory variables,sample tail-shrinking treatment and adding fixed effects show that the estimated results are still robust.Finally,based on the purpose of reducing the moral hazard of agricultural insurance,from the perspective of the degree of part-time employment,the author puts forward five countermeasures and suggestions,including attracting professional labor to return home,improving the structure of agricultural capital investment,rationally setting deductibles,enhancing the insurance awareness of farmers and strengthening the targeted investigation of insurance companies.

关 键 词：非农兼业 农业保险 道德风险 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F326.11[经济管理—产业经济] F842.66