透明性之外:当代自我知识研究中的推断主义新光  

Beyond Transparency:New Enlightenment of Contemporary Research on Self-Knowledge in Inference

作　　者：方玄子 FANG Xuan-zi(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第5期101-110,共10页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：哲学研究中,自我知识通常是指关于一个人的特定心理状态的知识,包括一个人的信念、欲望和感觉。主流观点认为,我们获得自我知识的方式来源于内部观察,在这种视角下,自我知识具有即时性与透明性的特征。而近来一些研究者认为,推断可能是另一种有效途径,劳勒、卡萨姆与林奇吸收并修改了赖尔饱受批判的传统推断主义观点,提出自我知识是主体从证据中推断获得,证据主要为内部提示与行为证据。这种新推断主义指出,我们并没有自己想象的那样可以在自身内心状态的归属上做到绝对的正确和理性,这在理论上回复了传统推断主义面临的反对意见,并论证了自身的合理性,不仅使得推断成为自我知识的新的有效来源而非补充证据,而且填补了内部观察的自我知识在解释内在欺骗现象上的缺位,在消除主流观点对推断主义的歧视中作出了很大的努力。In philosophy,“self-knowledge”standardly refers to knowledge of one’s own sensations,thoughts,beliefs,and other mental states.The prevailing view is that people acquire self-knowledge by inner observation,and that self-knowledge is characterized by immediacy and transparency.Recently,some researchers have argued that inference can become another effective way when acquiring self-knowledge.Lawler,Cassam,and Lynch have absorbed and modified Ryle’s criticized traditional inferentialism view,proposing that self-knowledge is the inference from evidence,such as internal promptings and behavioral evidence.Neo-inferentialists point out that we cannot be absolutely correct and rational in the attribution of our own mental state as we think,and they reply to the objections faced by the traditional inferentialism,and proof for its own rationality.It helps making neo-inferentialism a new effective source of self-knowledge instead of a supplementary evidence,but also filling the gap between inner observation and the phenomenon of self-deception,and making great efforts to eliminate the discrimination from popular opinion on inferentialism.

关 键 词：自我知识 推断主义 内部提示 内部观察 即时性 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论] B017.9