重访现实主义法学——以弗兰克为中心  

Legal Realism Revisited:Focusing on Jerome Frank

作　　者：王绍喜 WANG Shaoxi(Law School,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学法学院,天津300072

出　　处：《北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第6期48-58,共11页Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：天津大学2024年度自主创新基金项目(2024XSC-0031)。

摘　　要：在建构中国自主法学知识体系的背景下,有必要重访现实主义法学,挖掘其对中国法学理论和法律实践的价值。当前,中国对现实主义法学的研究存在一些不足:对弗兰克的研究过于强调他的极端观点,而没有注意到其建设性的一面;对弗兰克在司法判决书中的法理思想缺乏关注,对“规则怀疑论”与“事实怀疑论”的区分缺少反思;对现实主义法学的司法裁判理论有无新意缺乏探讨。弗兰克撰写的司法判决书表明,其关注法律事实,强调案件事实,但并不否认法律规则的作用,并对法官的作用有着全面的认识。弗兰克关于“规则怀疑论”与“事实怀疑论”的区分缺乏说服力。塔玛纳哈关于现实主义法学的司法裁判理论没有新意的观点无法成立。通过对弗兰克的研究,可以揭示现实主义法学的洞见及其在中国当下的价值。Under the background of constructing China’s independent legal knowledge system,it is necessary to revisit legal realism and explore its value to Chinese legal theory and practice.There are some deficiencies in the current research on legal realism in China.The research on Frank lays too much emphasis on his extreme views,but does not pay attention to his constructive views,and his juristic thought in judicial judgments.In addition,few scholars have made reflection on the distinction between rule-scepticism and fact-scepticism,and explored whether there is any novelty in the theory of judicial adjudication of legal realism.The judicial decisions written by Frank show that he focuses on legal facts and stresses the facts of cases.He does not deny the role of legal rules and has a comprehensive knowledge of the role of judges.However,his distinction between rule-skepticism and fact-skepticism is not persuasive.Tamanaha’s view that there is nothing new in the theory of judicial adjudication of legal realism cannot be justified.Through the study of Frank,the study can reveal the insights of legal realism and its current value in China.

关 键 词：现实主义法学 司法裁判理论 弗兰克 规则怀疑论 事实怀疑论 

分 类 号：D909.3[政治法律—法学理论] D909.7[政治法律—法学]