基于审计准则周期性调整的审计发现风险演化博弈模型  

The Evolutionary Game Model for Audit Detection Risk Based on Periodic Adjustments of Auditing Standards

作　　者：汤常一[1] 王雷 TANG Changyi;WANG Lei(Audit Office,Criminal Investigation Police University of China,Shenyang 110854;School Public Administration,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025)

机构地区：[1]中国刑事警察学院审计处,沈阳110854 [2]东北财经大学公共管理学院,大连116025

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2024年第11期3323-3334,共12页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71974067,72131009)资助课题。

摘　　要：在审计实践中存在一些被低估的问题,即审计师和客户采取群体行为,群体行为对审计风险有何影响,如何避免审计风险等.文章建立了演化博弈理论框架解决审计风险中的发现风险问题.然后,提供了关于案例的理论证明和数值分析.面对信息不足和不断变化的审计准则,利益相关者更普遍和合理的行为是模仿或群体行为.反之,模仿行为进一步放大了市场的波动和审计风险.也就是,演化均衡体现为一个极限周期,它放大了审计失灵波动范围,而不同于传统博弈中的混合均衡点.因此,定期调整审计准则可以有效地避免审计风险.In auditing practice,there are some underestimated issues,such as auditors and clients engaging in herd behavior,the impact of herd behavior on audit risk,and how to avoid audit risk.The authors have established an evolutionary game theory framework to address the audit detection risk problem.Subsequently,theoretical proofs and numerical analyses have been provided regarding a specific case.Faced with insufficient information and constantly changing auditing standards,stakeholders tend to exhibit more common and reasonable behavior,which is imitation or herd behavior.Conversely,imitation behavior further magnifies market volatility and audit risk.In other words,the evolutionary equilibrium manifests as a limit cycle,amplifying the fluctuation range of audit failure compared to the mixed equilibrium point in traditional games.Therefore,periodic adjustments to auditing standards can effectively mitigate audit risks.

关 键 词：审计 准则周期性调整 演化博弈 审计发现风险 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]