异质性服务平台直营、转销或混合渠道结构选择  

Heterogeneous Service Platform Direct Sales,Reselling or Hybrid Channel Structure Selection

作　　者：郭松波 艾兴政[2] 何浩嘉 唐华 GUO Songbo;AI Xingzheng;HE Haojia;TANG Hua(Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan,China;University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu,China;Xihua University,Chengdu,China;Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu,China)

机构地区：[1]太原理工大学经济与管理学院 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都市611731 [3]西华大学管理学院 [4]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2024年第11期1688-1697,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(20&ZD084);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072022)。

摘　　要：考虑异质性服务质量努力与两部定价佣金合同,构建制造商和平台构成的博弈模型,研究异质性服务平台渠道结构,识别直营、转销和混合3种渠道结构成为平台、制造商及系统最佳选择的条件。研究表明,当平台向制造商收取一定范围的固定管理费用时,异质性服务平台选择混合渠道;制造商入侵平台形成的混合渠道会提高批发价格,加剧双重边际效应;制造商服务质量努力系数增大能够减弱服务异质性,使得混合渠道中的批发价格降低,销量增加,促进制造商提升服务质量。并通过设计有效的两部定价佣金合同,使得混合渠道实现Pareto最优。This study constructs a game model involving manufacturers and platforms,considering heterogeneous service quality efforts and two-part tariff commission contracts,to examine the channel structure of heterogeneous service platforms and identify the conditions under which direct sales,reselling and a hybrid of both become the optimal choice for platforms,manufacturers and the system.The findings indicate that heterogeneous service platforms opt for the hybrid channel when the platform charges manufacturers a fixed management fee within a certain range.The formation of a hybrid channel through manufacturer invasion of the platform leads to increased wholesale prices and exacerbates the double marginalization effect.An increase in the manufacturer’s service quality effort coefficient can reduce service heterogeneity,resulting in lower wholesale prices and higher sales in the hybrid channel,thereby encouraging manufacturers to improve service quality.By designing an effective two-part tariff commission contract,the hybrid channel achieves a Pareto optimum.

关 键 词：异质性服务 混合渠道 两部定价 佣金合同 制造商入侵 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]