薪酬追索扣回机制与国有企业ESG表现  

Rule of Compensation Clawback and ESG Performance of State-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：周冬华[1] 杨柳 赵玉洁 ZHOU Dong-hua;YANG Liu;ZHAO Yu-jie(School of Economics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China;School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013 [2]上海大学管理学院,上海200444

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2024年第12期87-104,共18页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71972091);江西省研究生创新项目(YC2023-S427)。

摘　　要：高管薪酬乱象丛生的背景下,薪酬追索扣回机制能否发挥治理作用是落实国有企业责任追究工作的关键。本文以2010-2021年沪深A股国有企业为样本,分析国有企业实施薪酬追索扣回机制能否有效缓解所有者与高管团队之间的代理问题,从而提升企业ESG表现。研究发现,薪酬追索扣回机制的实施显著提升了国有企业ESG表现,主要通过强化高管团队风险意识和抑制其短期主义行为两种机制实现。异质性检验发现,薪酬追索扣回机制条款越详实、追索薪酬范围越广,越有利于薪酬追索扣回机制发挥积极作用。此外,薪酬追索扣回机制对国有企业ESG责任履行的推动作用主要表现在高管团队拥有专业背景成员较少、持股比例较低,CEO预期任期较短、未拥有学术经历,非重污染行业以及政府管制行业的企业组别。In the context of rampant irregularities in executive compensation,whether system of compensation clawback can play a governance role is crucial for implementing the accountability work of state-owned enterprises.This paper takes A-share state-owned enterprises(SOEs)on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2021 as the sample and analyzes whether implementing system of compensation clawback can effectively alleviate the principal-agent problem between owners and executive team to improve ESG performance of enterprises.It is found that the implementation of system of compensation clawback significantly improves ESG performance of SOEs,which is achieved mainly through two mechanisms:enhancing risk awareness of executive team and suppressing their short termism behaviors.Heterogeneity tests show that the more detailed the terms or the wider scope of compensation of system of compensation clawback is,the more favorable it is for system of compensation clawback to play a positive role.Moreover,the promotion effect of system of compensation clawback on the fulfillment of ESG responsibilities in SOEs is mainly manifested in the enterprises where fewer members have professional backgrounds in the executive team,with lower shareholding ratio,with shorter expected tenure of CEOs,lack of academic experience,and in non-heavy pollution industries and government regulated industries.

关 键 词：ESG表现 薪酬追索扣回机制 短视主义 风险意识 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]