环境群体性事件初期阶段的三方演化博弈分析  

Analysis of Three-Way Evolutionary Game in the Initial Stage of Environmental Mass Incidents

作　　者：祁雪婷 卜凡亮[1] QI Xue-ting;BU Fan-liang(School of Information Network Security,People's Public Security University of China,Beijing 100038,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民公安大学信息网络安全学院,北京100038

出　　处：《计算机仿真》2024年第11期341-346,511,共7页Computer Simulation

基　　金：中国人民公安大学双一流创新研究项目(2023SYL08)。

摘　　要：当前,我国经济正处于高速发展期,公众环保意识不断增强,因环境污染造成的群体性事件呈“井喷式”增长。公众在事件的发生初期参与决策,可有效防止冲突的发生。为改善邻避项目决策阶段的公众参与状况,以环境群体性事件发生初期的地方政府、投资企业和周边公众三个主要利益相关方为研究对象,运用进化博弈理论,探讨不同利益诉求下对三方战略选择的影响。结果显示:各方利益的主体在充分沟通,秉承“政府主导、企业尽责、百姓拥护”的基本原则下,能够主动化解矛盾,减少群体性环境事件的发生。At present,China's economy is in a period of rapid development,the public's awareness of environmental protection is increasing,and mass incidents caused by environmental pollution are growing"blowout".Public participation in decision-making at an early stage of an incident can effectively prevent conflict.To improve public participation in the decision-making stage of NIMBY projects,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to explore the impact of different interest demands on tripartite strategic choices by taking three main stakeholders:local governments,investment enterprises and the surrounding public in the early stage of environmental mass incidents.The results show that the subjects of all interests can actively resolve conflicts and reduce the occurrence of mass en-vironmental incidents under the basic principle of"government leadership,enterprise responsibility,and people's sup-port"under the basic principle of"government leadership,enterprise responsibility,and people's support".

关 键 词：进化博弈 环境群体性事件 仿真分析 

分 类 号：X956[环境科学与工程—安全科学]