卖空机制能够抑制企业杠杆操纵行为吗?  

Can Short Selling Suppress Enterprises'Leverage Manipulation?

作　　者：白雪莲 刘璐 贺萌 BAI Xue-lian;LIU Lu;HE Meng

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070

出　　处：《现代金融研究》2024年第11期47-57,共11页Journal of modern finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“卖空机制对企业投资行为的作用机理与效果研究——基于‘脱虚向实’的视角”(71903134);首都经济贸易大学博士研究生学术新人计划项目(2024XSXR08)的资助。

摘　　要：本文以2007-2022年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨卖空机制对企业杠杆操纵行为的影响。研究发现,卖空机制能够抑制企业杠杆操纵行为,“信息效应”和“威慑效应”是卖空机制发挥作用的两条路径。异质性分析结果表明,卖空机制对企业杠杆操纵行为的影响在公司内部治理水平较低、外部监管距离较远以及融资约束程度较高的企业中更显著。此外,聚焦债券发行这一场景后发现,卖空机制能够显著抑制发债企业的杠杆操纵行为;考虑杠杆操纵手段后发现,卖空机制通过降低企业表外负债和名股实债规模,进而抑制企业杠杆操纵行为。Taking the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 in China as the research sample,the paper investi-gates the impact of short selling on enterprises'leverage manipulation.It is found that short selling can effectively sup-press enterprises'leverage manipulation.The"information effect"and the"deterrence effect"are two pathways through which short selling inhibit corporate leverage manipulation.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of short selling on corporate leverage manipulation is more pronounced in companies with lower internal governance levels,greater external regulatory distance and more severe degree of financing constraints.Focusing on bond issuance scenario,the paper finds that short selling significantly curbs leverage manipulation by companies issuing bonds.Considering the means of leverage manipulation,the study demonstrates that short selling can significantly reduce the magnitude of off-balance sheet liabilities and real debt in the name of shares,thereby suppressing corporate leverage manipulation.

关 键 词：卖空机制 杠杆操纵 信息效应 威慑效应 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275