气象指数保险下订单农业供应链的政府补贴机制  

Government subsidy mechanism considering weather index insurance in a contract-farming supply chain

作　　者：林强[1] 刘煌 冯佳丽 林晓刚 Lin Qiang;Liu Huang;Feng Jiali;Lin Xiaogang(School of Management,Guangdong University of Technoloay,Guangzhou 510520,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2024年第6期885-902,共18页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72471064,72471063);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(22YJC630079);广东省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(GD23XGL023);广东省基础与应用基础研究资助项目(2021A1515011969).

摘　　要：农业生产遭受自然灾害的威胁且农户面临销售难的困扰,因此各级政府出台了补贴政策促进农业发展并帮助农户增产增收,那么如何选择补贴方式来保证补贴政策的有效性?为此,在气象指数保险下,构建由农户、涉农企业、政府和保险公司组成的订单农业供应链的Stackelberg博弈决策模型,探讨了生产成本补贴与收购价格补贴对供应链各成员的影响.研究表明:与无补贴机制的农户效用对比,政府提供生产成本补贴时反而有可能损害农户的效用,而提供收购价格补贴时农户的效用总是增加.当天气指数较小(较大),即农户所获赔付额较少(较多)时,政府提供收购价格(生产成本)补贴更能提升农户效用和涉农企业收益,且政府提供生产成本补贴更利于提升社会福利.Agricultural production is threatened by natural disasters and farmers are facing difficulties in sales.This induces governments to propose subsidy policies to improve these problems.One natural question is which subsidy policy can ensure effectiveness.To answer this question,this paper builds a Stackelberg game decision-making model for a contract-farming supply chain with farmers,agribusinesses,governments,and insurance companies under the weather index insurance framework.The goal is to study the impacts of production cost and purchase price subsidies on each member of the supply chain.The research shows that production cost subsidy might be detrimental for the farmers,but purchase price subsidy will increase the utility of farmers.When the weather index is small(large),indicating that farmers receive less(more)compensation,purchase price(production cost)subsidies can better improve the utility of the farmers and the benefits of agribusinesses.Additionally,providing production cost subsidies is more effective in improving social welfare.

关 键 词：自然灾害 气象指数保险 订单农业供应链 生产成本补贴 收购价格补贴 

分 类 号：F332[经济管理—产业经济]