论我国人工智能法律主体资格的情理因素  

Study on the Emotional Reasoning Factor of the Legal Subject Qualification of Artificial Intelligence(AI)in China

作　　者：熊宇翔 Xiong Yuxiang(Law School of Hainan University,Haikou 570100)

机构地区：[1]海南大学法学院,海南海口570100

出　　处：《中阿科技论坛（中英文）》2024年第12期151-155,共5页China-Arab States Science and Technology Forum

基　　金：海南省研究生创新科研课题“技术嵌入数字政府建设的风险及法律应对”阶段性成果(QHYB2023-55)。

摘　　要：目前,随着人工智能技术的进步和应用场景的拓展,社会各界也日益积极拥抱人工智能。与此同时,人工智能的飞速发展使得当前社会不得不认真审视人工智能的角色和地位。关于人工智能是否应当被赋予主体地位的问题越来越受关注,其中诸多问题解决的前提是厘清人工智能的主体资格。目前存在三种学说:可赋予人工智能法律主体地位说、不应赋予人工智能法律地位说、有限赋予人工智能法律地位说。这些学说未对法律主体资格的法律特征加以归纳。文章认为,人工智能可否作为法律主体,需围绕宪法学基础、法律人格理论、理性标准来讨论。在我国,人工智能能否成为法律主体,还需要考虑能否以情理作为基本的认知方式。文章提出,人工智能目前不具备学习情理的能力与运用情理的可能,如果该问题不能得以解决,人工智能很难获取法律主体资格。Currently,with the advancement of AI and the expansion of application scenarios,various sectors of society are increasingly embracing AI.At the same time,the booming of AI has forced the society to carefully examine its role and status.The issue of whether AI should be given a subject status is receiving increasing attention,in which the key to solving this issue is to clarify the subject qualification of AI.There are currently three theories:can be given,should not be given and partly given.All these theories have not elaborated on the characteristics of legal subject qualification.Thus,the issue can be argued in terms of the foundations of constitutional law,juridical personality theory and rational standards.In addition,emotional reasoning should also be taken into account.In summary,the article believes that AI lacks the ability to learn and apply emotional reasoning,and if this problem cannot be addressed,it will be difficult for AI to obtain legal subject qualification.

关 键 词：人工智能 情理认知 法律主体资格 

分 类 号：D920.0[政治法律—法学]