中等强国应对大国干涉的逻辑与选择——基于军购案例的研究  

The Logic and Options of Middle Powers in Responding to the Interference of Major Powers:A Study Based on the Case of Arms Purchases

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作  者:张启平 沈泽源 Zhang Qiping;Shen Zeyuan

机构地区:[1]北京大学国际关系学院 [2]中国社会科学院大学国际政治经济学院

出  处:《俄罗斯东欧中亚研究》2024年第6期49-74,159,160,共28页Russian,East European & Central Asian Studies

基  金:中国社会科学院学科建设“登峰战略”资助计划(DF2023ZD29)的资助。

摘  要:大国竞争背景下,中等强国群体如何应对体系主导国“选边站队”的威胁值得关注。既有研究认为,中等强国能够通过对冲等战略行为维持相对自主,也会借助多边场合推进有利于自身的共同规范以限制大国行为。然而中等强国并不能总是依靠其社会性身份寻求应对大国的折冲空间。在双边关系特别是涉及彼此安全关切的语境下,中等强国必须独自应对大国的干涉。其中,武器贸易在需求侧具有明确的内政属性,但在供给侧却不可避免地被高度工具化。这种张力使军购场景在研究大国干涉中等强国内政的场景时具有相当的代表性。本文构建了以自主性和军售国支持为核心变量的分析框架,解释中等强国群体独立应对大国干涉的决策逻辑。对军购国而言,自主性首先影响其拒绝干涉的成本,军售方支持则影响拒绝干涉的收益,两者的结合衍生出对成本收益的不同感知和选择。基于不同案例的分析一方面佐证了上述论点,另一方面为中国加强同中等强国群体安全合作,通过契合后者对自主性的追求以排除潜在干扰提供了政策参考。随着中美战略竞争态势的加剧,中国有必要以政治和经济手段创造性地影响他国内政,引导中等强国群体对国际权力结构变化形成正向预期。In the context of competition between major powers,it is worthwhile to analyze how the group of middle powers responds to the threat of"taking sides"by the dominant power in the system.Prior research indicates that middle powers can maintain relative autonomy through strategic behaviors such as hedging,and they can also promote common norms that benefit themselves in multilateral settings,thereby restraining the behavior of major powers.Nevertheless,middle powers cannot always rely on their social identity to seek room for maneuver against major powers.In the context of bilateral relations,especially those involving mutual security concerns,middle powers must deal with great power interference on their own.Among these,the arms trade has a clear domestic attribute on the demand side,but is inevitably highly instrumental on the supply side.This tension makes the arms purchase scenario quite representative for studying major power interference in the domestic affairs of middle powers.This paper constructs an analytical framework with national autonomy and arms-selling state support as the core variables to explain the decision-making logic of a group of middle powers to independently respond to interference by major powers.For countries engaged in military procurement,national autonomy initially affects the cost of rejecting interference,whereas the support of the arms-selling state affects the benefits of rejecting interference.The combination of the two leads to different perceptions and choices regarding costs and benefits.Analysis of different cases not only validates these arguments but also offers policy insights for China to enhance security cooperation with middle powers by resonating with their quest for autonomy,thereby forestalling potential interferences.As the strategic competition between China and the United States intensifies,it is imperative for China to ingeniously influence the internal affairs of other countries through political and economic instruments and direct the cohort of middle-power coun

关 键 词:中等强国 大国竞争 “选边站队” 军购 

分 类 号:D81[政治法律—国际关系] E11[政治法律—政治学]

 

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