双重治理下煤炭运输企业的碳减排演化博弈研究  

Research on the evolutionary game of carbon emission reduction for coal transportation enterprises under dual governance

作　　者：王喜莲[1,2] 查秀峰 WANG Xilian;ZHA Xiufeng(College of Management,Xi'an University of Science and Technology,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710054,China;Research Center of Energy Economy and Management,Xi'an University of Science and Technology,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安科技大学管理学院,陕西省西安市710054 [2]西安科技大学能源经济与管理研究中心,陕西省西安市710054

出　　处：《中国煤炭》2024年第11期30-37,共8页China Coal

基　　金：陕西省社会科学基金项目(2022D063);西安科技大学社会科学繁荣项目(2022SZ01)。

摘　　要：传统的煤炭运输方式产生了大量碳排放,受利润最大化驱使,煤炭运输企业的碳减排行为需要地方、中央政府的双重治理。运用演化博弈理论和数值仿真法,构建了中央政府、地方政府和煤炭运输企业三方演化博弈模型,借助MATLAB仿真分析软件进行情景仿真。结果表明:中央及地方政府碳减排成本过大会导致政府不能很好地履行职责;地方政府的初始意愿会影响煤炭运输企业的策略选择;企业的碳减排成本过大会影响碳减排意愿;碳减排罚金与政府、企业的策略选择呈正相关,奖金对被监督主体策略选择呈正相关,但对监督主体策略则呈负相关,因此罚金、奖金的设置非常关键。基于此提出促进煤炭运输企业碳减排的建议。The traditional coal transportation has produced a lot of carbon emissions.Driven by profit maximization,the carbon emission reduction behaviors of coal transportation enterprises need the dual governance of local and central governments.By using evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation method,a tripartite evolutionary game model of central government,local government and coal transportation enterprise was constructed,and the scenario simulation was carried out with the help of MATLAB simulation software.The results showed that the excessive cost of carbon emission reduction for the central and local governments would result in the inability of the government to fulfill its responsibilities effectively;the initial willingness of local government would affect the strategic choice of coal transportation enterprises;excessive carbon reduction costs for coal transportation enterprises would affect their willingness to reduce carbon emissions;carbon emission reduction penalty was positively correlated with the strategy choices of the governments and enterprises,and the bonus was positively correlated with the strategy choices of the supervised subjects,but negatively correlated with the supervisors'strategies.So the setting of the penalty and bonus was very crucial.On the basis,some suggestions were proposed to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction by coal transportation enterprises.

关 键 词：煤炭运输企业 碳减排 双重治理 演化博弈 情景仿真 

分 类 号：TD-9[矿业工程]