碳核查合谋行为的奖惩动态性与时滞性研究  

Dynamic and time-delay features of reward and punishment measures for collusive behavior in carbon verification

作　　者：董雨[1,2] 刘佳旭 韦玉婷 袁雪 DONG Yu;LIU Jiaxu;WEI Yuting;YUAN Xue(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei Anhui 230026,China;School of Economics and Management,Anhui University of Science and Technology,Huainan Anhui 232001,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026 [2]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232001

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2024年第10期30-44,共15页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“创新驱动下能源行业结构转型的效率评价、策略博弈及发展模式研究”(批准号:71973001)。

摘　　要：在当前全球致力于实现碳达峰、碳中和的背景下,建立一个高效且可信的碳市场对于促进碳排放减少至关重要。为保障碳市场运行中碳排放报告数据的真实性、可靠性和科学性,中国政府借鉴国际碳核查运行机制,采取了一套监测(monitoring,M)、报告(reporting,R)、核查(verification,V),即MRV体系,其核心是地方政府引入第三方核查机构对企业碳排放报告进行核查,并将结果反馈给政府。而在实际运行中,会出现合谋问题,即排放企业通过向第三方机构寻租从而隐瞒真实的碳排放量,此类合谋问题给碳市场合规运行带来挑战。为探究地方政府如何解决上述合谋问题,该研究构建了3种演化博弈模型,分别是静态奖惩模型、动态奖惩模型和时滞效应模型,在此基础上,基于中国深圳市碳市场运行数据进行理论分析与仿真分析。研究结果表明:(1)碳核查体系发展存在3个阶段,中间阶段是一个不稳定阶段,这一阶段碳核查体系中所有参与者意愿选择概率产生波动,造成了政府奖惩出现失效的情况。(2)动态奖惩机制的引入对于碳核查体系中间阶段产生的不稳定性具有正向的调节作用,可使得碳核查体系演化围绕着唯一的理想稳定策略趋近;而时滞效应的引入可以使系统更快地趋近理想稳定状态,对于不稳定性具有更明显的调节效果。(3)地方政府对第三方机构的监管比对排放企业的监管难度更大。因此,地方政府需要设定严格的第三方机构准入标准,并根据第三方机构与排放企业的行为,灵活制定奖惩措施,以确保碳核查体系的合规运行。In the current global effort to achieve peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality,establishing an efficient and credible carbon market is crucial for promoting the reduction of carbon emissions.To ensure the authenticity,reliability,and scientific nature of carbon emission reporting in the operation of the carbon market,the Chinese government has adopted a Monitoring,Reporting,and Verification(MRV) system based on the management methods of international carbon markets.The core of this system is for local governments to introduce third-party verification institutions to check enterprises' carbon emission reports and report to the government.In practice,collusion often occurs,where emitting enterprises bribe third-party institutions to conceal the actual amount of carbon emissions,posing challenges to the compliant operation of the carbon market.To explore how local governments can solve the collusion problems,this study constructed three types of evolutionary game models:a static reward-punishment model,a dynamic reward-punishment model,and a time-delay effect model.On this basis,theoretical and simulation analyses were conducted using the operation data of the Shenzhen carbon market in China.The research findings indicated that:(1) The development of the carbon verification system experienced three stages,with the middle stage being an unstable phase where the intentions of all participants could not converge,leading to significant volatility within the carbon verification system and resulting in the ineffectiveness of government rewards and punishments during this phase.(2) The introduction of dynamic reward and punishment measures had a positive regulatory effect on the instability of the middle stage of the carbon verification system,allowing the system to evolve around a unique evolutionary stable strategy spiral;the introduction of the time-delay effect could make the system evolution approach an ideal stable state,having a more significant regulatory effect on instability.(3) Local governments' regulation

关 键 词：碳核查 演化博弈 动态奖惩机制 时滞效应 第三方机构 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]