地方政府隐性负债与企业创新——基于制造业上市公司的经验证据  

Implicit Liabilities of Local Governments and Corporate Innovation——A Study Based on Empirical Evidence of Listed Manufacturing Enterprises

作　　者：黎精明[1,2] 张婉 LI Jingming;ZHANG Wan(School of Management,Wuhan University of Science&Technology,Wuhan 430065,China;Center for Industrial Policy and Management Research,Wuhan 430065,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,武汉430065 [2]湖北产业政策与管理研究中心,武汉430065

出　　处：《科技与经济》2024年第6期16-20,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目——“地方政府隐性债务风险网状扩散机理及防控对策研究”(项目编号:21BJY127,项目负责人:黎精明)成果之一。

摘　　要：基于地方政府隐性负债规模不断扩大的现实背景,采用2012—2022年省级面板数据与属地制造业上市公司的交叉样本,讨论地方政府隐性负债对企业创新的影响。研究发现,地方政府隐性负债对企业创新具有明显抑制作用;其中,金融错配发挥了中介效应,即地方政府隐性负债加剧了企业金融错配,进而抑制了企业创新。该结论不仅能为地方政府隐性负债治理提供理论依据,也能为改善企业创新的政府环境提供启迪。Based on the realistic background of the expanding scale of implicit liabilities of local governments,a cross-sample of provincial panel data and listed companies in the manufacturing industry of the prefecture from 2012 to 2022 is used to discuss the relationship between the impact of implicit liabilities of local governments on corporate innovation.The study shows that implicit liabilities of local governments have a significant inhibitory effect on corporate innovation;in this case,financial mismatch plays an intermediary effect,i.e.,implicate liabilities of local governments exacerbate enterprises financial mismatch,which in turn inhibits enterprise innovation.The conclusions in this paper not only provides a theoretical basis for the governance of implicate liabilities of local governments,but also provides inspiration for improving the governmental environment for corporate innovation.

关 键 词：地方政府隐性负债 企业创新 金融错配 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济] F832.51F273.1F812.5