动态税收补贴政策对新能源汽车推广的动力学分析——基于政府、消费者的演化博弈模型  

Dynamic Analysis of Dynamic Tax Subsidy Policy on the Promotion of New Energy Vehicles--Two-party Evolutionary Game Model Based on Government and Consumer

作　　者：李燕 王亭栋[1] 王东 陈俞有 Li Yan;Wang Tingdong;Wang Dong;Chen Yuyou

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学经济学院,浙江省杭州市310018 [2]浙江财经大学经济行为与决策研究中心,浙江省杭州市310018 [3]浙江工业大学之江学院机械工程学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2024年第12期44-68,共25页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金“复杂网络中惩罚机制下的合作演化——Agent仿真与行为实验的对比性研究”(19YJC630087);浙江省自然科学基金一般项目“动态复杂网络上的冲突博弈演化分析”(LQ20G010007)资助。

摘　　要：发展节能新能源汽车是落实“双碳”建设目标的有效手段,政府和消费者作为新能源汽车的主体,在推广新能源汽车的过程中起着举足轻重的作用。为了进一步探究促使新能源汽车推广的最优税收和补贴政策,在新能源汽车税收与补贴退坡的现实背景下,文章从动态税收与补贴政策的新视角出发,构建基于政府与消费者的演化博弈模型,应用演化均衡分析与仿真实验方法,探究不同形式的财税政策组合下政府与消费者的演化稳定策略。演化博弈均衡分析表明,静态税收和静态补贴政策下博弈系统演化无法自动达到均衡点,不存在演化稳定策略;而动态税收和静态补贴、静态税收和动态补贴、动态税收和动态补贴三种机制时都可以使演化达到均衡。仿真实验结果进一步表明,静态税收和动态补贴政策策略组合表现最优,极大促进了新能源汽车的推广。该研究结论在新能源汽车补贴退坡的背景下具有重要的现实意义,为政府优化推广政策提供了重要的借鉴意义。同时,仿真实验的研究方法,也为探索不同政策多变性的效果提供了更多可能。The development of fuel-efficient new energy vehicles is an effective means to implement the goal of"double carbon"construction.As the main body of new energy automobile consumption,consumers play a vital role in the process of promoting new energy automobile.In order to discuss the role of tax and subsidy policies on promoting new energy vehicles more effectively,based on the background of tax and subsidy reductions for new energy vehicles,this paper builds the two-party evolutionary game model based on government and consumer considering the dynamic tax and subsidy policies.According to the stability analysis and simulation experiment,the evolution of static tax and static subsidy policy can not reach the equilibrium point automatically,and there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy.When introducing dynamic tax and static subsidy,static tax and dynamic subsidy,dynamic tax and dynamic subsidy,evolution can be balanced.Through the simulation analysis of the comparison of the three dynamic support policies,we can find that the combination of static tax and dynamic subsidy policy is the best,which promotes the new energy vehicles more effectively.In the reality that subsidies for new energy vehicles are declining,this research conclusion has important practical significance and provides important reference for the government to adjust its promotion policies.At the same time,the research method of simulation experiment provides more possibilities for exploring the effects of different policy variability.

关 键 词：演化博弈模型 复制动力学分析 仿真 税收与补贴 新能源汽车 

分 类 号：F011[经济管理—政治经济学] F016