农地流转三方利益主体决策行为分析  

Analysis of Decision-Making Behavior of Tripartite Stakeholders in the Farmland Transfer

作　　者：谢荣见 贾玉财 穆肖悦 汪峰 Xie Rongjian;Jia Yucai;Mu Xiaoyue;Wang Feng(Business School,Nanjing University of Information Science&Technology,Nanjing 210044,China;School of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China)

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学商学院,江苏南京210044 [2]安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,安徽芜湖241000

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第11期37-52,共16页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(20CRK005,16BGL201);国家自然科学基金项目(71904088);南京信息工程大学人才启动经费项目。

摘　　要：针对农地流转因利益再分配失衡造成主体利益诉求难以满足、政府政策措施缺乏有效针对性,造成推动成效不足而导致农地流转长期处于低效缓慢的局面,本文建立以地方政府、承包方和受让方为三方利益主体的农地流转SD演化博弈模型,基于期望效用理论和Lyapunov第一法则,分别对博弈主体策略稳定性与系统组合策略稳定性进行分析,并以河南省国家现代农业示范区为例,对主体决策行为进行反馈调控仿真研究。研究结果表明:农业基础设施状况与农地流转政策是导致农地流转进程不同的根源,主体博弈演化轨迹受农地流转再分配利益影响,但最终系统演化处于均衡稳定状态(推动,流转,流转);流转双方决策行为对系统稳定性起决定性作用,转业收入与农地租金的增长均有利于促使承包方倾向于选择流转策略,农地产出收益的高低是影响受让方流转意愿的最主要因素;在农地产出收益较高的地区,政府对农地流转博弈系统稳定性影响较小,而在农地产出收益较低的地区,政府推动力度对受让方流转农地的意愿影响显著。Since the central government proposed the motion of rural land transfer,the transfer of agricultural land has achieved remarkable results.However,there are still some areas where the transfer of agricultural land is in an inefficient,slow,and disorderly state.This is because there are different stakeholders in the process of farmland transfer,and whether their interest demands can be met affects the orderly transfer of farmland.Therefore,how to reasonably redistribute the interests of farmland transfer is the key to achieving the Pareto efficiency of the stakeholders.Since the interest demands of stakeholders are difficult to meet due to the imbalance in the redistribution of interests in the farmland transfer,the lack of effective pertinence of government policies has led to insufficient promotion results.As a result,the transfer of agricultural land lacks sufficient motivation,and stays an inefficient and slow situation in the long term.The SD(system dynamics)evolutionary game model of farmland transfer with the local government,the contractor,and the transferee as the tripartite players in the game is established.Based on the expected utility theory and Lyapunov's first law,the stability of the game players'strategies and the stability of the game system combination strategies are analyzed,respectively.Taking the national modern agricultural demonstration zone in Henan province as an example,the feedback regulation simulation analysis is carried out on the decision-making behavior of the tripartite game players.Data for the scenario simulations is mainly obtained from online consultation,Local Government Statistical Yearbook,Local Government Agricultural Survey Statistical Reports,Agricultural Price Survey Statistical Yearbook,Land Resource Network,China Agricultural Economic Information Network,and the academic literature.The results show that:The state of agricultural infrastructure and farmland transfer policies are the root causes of the different processes of farmland transfer in different regions,and the

关 键 词：农地流转 利益主体 SD演化博弈 决策行为 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F323.4[经济管理—产业经济]