中小无车承运人集中化运输合作——基于时间策略的视角  

A Cooperation Model among Small Non-Truck Operating Common Carriers under a Time Consolidation Policy

作　　者：刘舰[1,2] 方希荣 张双枣 Liu Jian;Fang Xirong;Zhang Shuangzao(School of Transportation and Traffic,Lanzhou jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070,China;Key Laboratory of Railway Industry on Plateau Railway Transportation Intelligent Management and Control,Lanzhou jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州交通大学交通运输学院,甘肃兰州730070 [2]兰州交通大学高原铁路运输智慧管控铁路行业重点实验室,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第11期136-143,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71761022)。

摘　　要：本文运用合作博弈理论研究了独立的中小无车承运人间通过集中化运输的合作问题。综合考虑了运能限制,运力现货市场价格、能力浪费惩罚等复杂情境,构建了基于时间策略的中小无车承运人联合集结成本分摊合作博弈模型。同现有的研究不同,该模型的特征函数是基于联盟规模变化而建立的多值函数。研究显示,基于时间策略的最优决策在不同条件的触发下,将进一步分化为四种基本的集结发车策略,并形成相应的四类联盟。进一步研究了运力现货市场价格和能力浪费惩罚的变化对形成最终联盟的影响和适应范围。发现了随着联盟规模的扩大,大联盟形成的规律,并由此预测了大联盟形成的可能类型和可能路径。最后,从近视和远视的视角,分别运用核心和远视稳定集研究了比例分配方案对于形成稳定大联盟的促进激励作用。In this paper,the problem,what are the characteristics of a blinding agreement for forming a stable grand coalition,is studied Based on a situation of small Non-Truck Operating Common Carriers cooperating by shipment consolidation,after considering the complicated scenarios such as transport capacity,freight spot market price,penalty of waste capacity,etc.,a cooperative game model is formulated under the typical time policy.Different from other research,the designed characteristic function is a piecewise function whose non-differential point changes as the difference of formed coalition.The departure strategies under the typical time-based policy will be further refined to the four consolidation strategies.The research shows that Full-loaded transportation is not always optimal,and under-loaded transportation may be optimal.The impacts of key parameters such as the freight spot market price and the penalty of waste capacity on decision-making are further explored,which shows when no other parameters are considered,then strategy I and strategy III are directly related to the penalty of waste capacity.The feasible range of the penalty of waste capacity is also discussed.With the increase of the transport spot price on decision-making.The trajectory of the final decision is changed from Strategy IV to Strategy II to Strategy III.The game is not necessarily subadditive,and the formation of the grand coalition is also more complicated.Finally,from the perspective of myopic and farsightedness,the stability of the grand coalition is studied.

关 键 词：集中化运输 时间策略 合作博弈 分配 大联盟稳定性 

分 类 号：F54[经济管理—产业经济]