考虑竞争情形的PPP项目投资者逆向选择问题研究  

Adverse Selection of Investors in PPP Project Considering Competition Scenario

作　　者：周亦宁 刘继才[2] 浦徐进 Zhou Yining;Liu Jicai;Pu Xujin(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214122,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第11期287-297,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71571149)。

摘　　要：PPP项目招投标阶段,投资者隐瞒自身真实能力信息,试图获取高收益的逆向选择问题亟待解决。因此,本研究构建招投标阶段投资者与政府的信号博弈模型,计算分析使投资者如实报价的分离均衡所应满足的条件。结论表明,政府给予高能力投资者的利润率存在一个最优取值区间,在此区间内可以实现市场上不同能力投资者如实报价的分离均衡。进一步考虑招投标阶段投资者存在内部竞争的情形,通过对不同能力投资者内部竞争的博弈分析发现,投资者之间的竞争对市场上不同能力投资者形成分离均衡条件的影响并不是绝对正面或者绝对负面的。只有当政府声誉损失值足够小时,不同能力投资者相互竞争才会有利于分离均衡的形成。否则,不同能力投资者之间竞争的存在使得政府给予高能力投资者的高利润率取值上限降低,不利于市场上分离均衡的形成。本文的研究可以为政府在招投标阶段正确识别投资者能力信息的机制设计提供理论依据和决策参考。In the bidding stage of PPP projects,some investors who lack sufficient strength and are unable to promote project efficiency improvement deceive the government through disguised means in order to obtain project franchise rights.This opportunistic behavior is called adverse selection.Once adverse selection by investors occurs,it can damage project performance and social benefits,and in severe cases,lead to the phenomenon of“bad money drives out good money”in the PPP project market.This will greatly hinder the sustainable development of the PPP model.It is necessary for the government to address the issue of adverse selection.Therefore,a signaling game model between government and investors is constructed.And the separation equilibrium conditions that reveal the investor's true capabilities are calculated.The results show that there is the optimal range of profit rate to satisfy the separation equilibrium conditions.Investors will choose to quote truthfully if and only if the profit rate set by the government is within the optimal range.In addition,considering the scenario that investors’competition,the strategy of investors is compared in different scenario.The results show that competition among investors has no absolute positive or negative influence on the formation of separation equilibrium conditions.Only when the government's reputation loss is small enough,the competition between investors with different abilities will be conducive to the formation of separation equilibrium.Otherwise,the existence of competition with different abilities reduces the upper limit of the profit rate given by the government,which is not conducive to the formation of separation equilibrium in the market.Finally,this paper uses actual data from the Bazhong to Wanyuan Expressway in Sichuan Province as a case study to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions drawn.The research of this paper can provide theoretical basis and decision-making reference for the mechanism design of the government to correctly identify investor

关 键 词：PPP项目 招投标阶段 逆向选择 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F282[经济管理—国民经济]