审计师变更与继任审计师稳健性  

Auditor Switching and Successor Auditor Conservatism

作　　者：夏艳春 辛清泉[2] 谭英琦 Xia Yanchun;Xin Qingquan;Tan Yingqi

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,214122 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400033 [3]重庆市双桥经济技术开发区投资促进局,400999

出　　处：《审计研究》2024年第6期133-146,共14页Auditing Research

基　　金：江苏省社会科学基金项目(项目批准号:24GLC008);重庆市教委人文社科项目(项目批准号:24SKGH032);国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71872022)的资助。

摘　　要：审计师对财务报告可信性存在疑虑的公司会实施更稳健的审计策略。本文考察瑞华会计师事务所经历康得新审计失败后,继任审计师是否对其客户实施了更稳健的审计策略。研究发现,与连续审计客户相比,继任审计师对瑞华会计师事务所原客户更加稳健。根据客户是否跟随签字注册会计师,将样本分为跟随与未跟随两类,研究发现未跟随客户审计师的稳健性显著更高,而跟随客户与连续审计客户在审计师稳健性方面不具有显著差异,该效应在高风险、业务复杂、大规模公司更加明显。进一步研究发现未跟随客户的被审计时间更长,支付了更低的审计费用。本研究表明当面临高审计风险时,审计师会执行更稳健的审计策略。Auditors implement more conservative audit strategies for companies whose credibility of financial reports is in question. This paper examines whether Ruihua's successor auditors implemented a more conservative audit strategy for the former Ruihua clients after suffering from the failure of the audits of Kangdexin. We find that the successor auditors implemented more conservative audit strategies for the former Ruihua's clients. In addition,based on whether the clients follow the former Ruihua individual CPAs, we categorize the sample into “following”and “non-following” groups, and find that auditor conservatism is significantly higher for “non-following” clients,while auditor conservatism is not significantly different for “following” and successive clients. Further analysis documents that the conservatism of successor auditors to “non-following” clients is more pronounced in highrisk firms, complex-business firms, and small firms. Further analysis shows that non-following clients are audited for longer periods and pay lower audit fees than successive clients. This paper suggests that auditors tend to implement more robust audit strategies when they are aware of audit risks.

关 键 词：审计师变更 审计师稳健性 应计利润 审计意见 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]