以政府为主体的监督引导方在四方演化博弈的创新生态系统中的影响机制  

The Influence Mechanism of Government as the Main Supervisory and Guiding Entity in the Evolutionary Game of the Four-Party Innovation Ecosystem

作　　者：蒋金利 廉振宇 游光荣 王颖婕 Jiang Jinli;Lian Zhenyu;You Guangrong;Wang Yingjie(Strategic Assessment and Consultation Institute,Academy of Military Sciences,Beijing 100091,China;Graduate School,Academy of Military Sciences,Beijing 100091,China)

机构地区：[1]军事科学院战略评估咨询中心,北京100091 [2]中国人民解放军军事科学院研究生院,北京100091

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2024年第20期185-196,共12页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：军事类研究生课题(JY2022B214)。

摘　　要：为了更好地发挥国家作为重大科技创新组织者的角色,健全社会主义市场经济条件下的新型举国体制,结合关键核心技术攻关任务重、周期长、风险高的现实背景,将以政府为主体的监督引导方作为独立主体融入创新生态系统,并赋予其新的时代内涵。在创新生态系统视角下,探讨分析各主体作用和利益诉求,建立主体间互动的逻辑框架,构建以知识技术为基础、组织监督为纽带、成果转化为核心、用户需求为导向的“知识供应方-技术转化方-监督引导方-用户需求方”模型。在有限理性假设下,从利益视角分析各博弈主体策略选择稳定性和系统整体演化趋势。通过演化博弈理论和微分定理找到可能存在的系统演化稳定点并进行稳定性分析,同时,借助计算机仿真手段厘清影响系统演化稳定性的关键因素。在系统演化趋势、不同初始策略选择概率影响模拟分析的基础上,重点对以政府为主体的监督引导方所涉及的参数影响进行模拟。模拟实验结果表明:系统演化趋势及过程符合分析结论,各博弈主体均在一定的时间周期内达到稳态;提高知识供应方、监督引导方和降低技术转化方、用户需求方的初始策略选择概率有助于加快演化博弈速度并提高系统稳定性。其中就监督引导方而言,采取监管策略及降低非科研支出成本均对系统稳定性产生正面效应,然而加大政策奖惩力度则会加剧系统演化博弈波动程度,并改变系统均衡点位置。这是因为当其作为独立主体参与创新时,加大监管力度会间接影响自身成本,而在有限理性假设下会趋利避害并调整策略选择。尽管在面对紧急重大任务时可以不计成本保持在强监管状态下解决问题,但这种方式无法持久可行。因此,为形成长效稳定的创新生态系统,建议引入评估举措,并通过提高评估鉴别能力成为政府监管的有效补充In order to better play the role of the state as an organizer of major scientific and technological innovation and improve the new national system under the socialist market economy,combined with the reality that the tasks of core technologies in key fields are urgent,the cycle is long,and the risk is high,the supervision and guidance party with the government as the main body will be integrated into the innovation ecosystem as an independent subject,and it will be given a new era connotation.From the perspective of the innovation ecosystem,this paper discusses and analyzes the roles and interests of various subjects,establishes a logical framework for interaction between subjects,and constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of knowledge suppliers,technology converters,supervisors,and users,which is based on knowledge and technology,linked by organizational supervision,centered on results transformation,and oriented to user needs.Under the assumption of bounded rationality,the stability of strategy selection of each game subject and the overall evolution trend of the system are analyzed from the perspective of interests.Through evolutionary game theory and differential theorem,possible system evolutionary stable points are found and stability analysis is conducted.At the same time,computer simulation is used to clarify the key factors affecting the stability of system evolution.Based on the simulation analysis of the system evolution trend and the influence of different initial strategy selection probabilities,the focus is on simulating the parameter influence involved in the supervision and guidance party with the government as the main body.The simulation experiment results show that the evolution trend and process of the system are consistent with the analysis conclusion,and all game players reach a steady state within a certain period;increasing the probability of initial strategy selection of knowledge suppliers,supervisors and guides,while reducing technology conversion and user demand will help spee

关 键 词：创新生态系统 四方演化博弈 关键核心技术 政府监管 科技创新 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] G301[文化科学]