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作 者:黄钲森 董洁霜[1] Zhengsen Huang;Jieshuang Dong(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai)
机构地区:[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海
出 处:《建模与仿真》2024年第6期6236-6245,共10页Modeling and Simulation
摘 要:随着旅游市场的繁荣发展,人们对旅游出行的需求持续增长,高铁成为旅游出行不可或缺的出行方式。然而随着全域旅游的盛行,“高铁+”的组合出行方式和私家车逐渐演变为了人们最主要的出行方式,为了响应国家低碳的政策以及缓解道路交通拥堵,让更多人采用“高铁+”组合出行的方式,本文通过构建政府管理部门与出行者策略选择的演化博弈模型,在引入政府奖励机制以及私家车停车管理费的基础上,对模型的演化路径及主要参数对演化结果的影响进行研究。同时,在讨论过程中对各种演化条件下的稳定平衡点进行分析和解释,并进行了参数敏感性分析,展示了政府不同的管理策略对模型演化速率的影响。With the prosperous development of the tourism market,people’s demand for tourism travel con-tinues to grow,and high-speed rail has become an indispensable mode of travel for tourism.How-ever,with the prevalence of global tourism,the combination of“high-speed rail+”and private cars has gradually evolved into the most important mode of transportation for people.In response to the national low-carbon policy and to alleviate road traffic congestion,and to encourage more peo-ple to adopt the combination of“high-speed rail+”,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government management departments and travelers’strategic choices.Based on the introduction of government reward mechanisms and private car parking management fees,the evolution path and the influence of the main parameters of the model on the evolution results are studied.Meanwhile,during the discussion,the stable equilibrium points under various evolution-ary conditions were analyzed and explained,and parameter sensitivity analysis was conducted to demonstrate the impact of different government management strategies on the model’s evolution rate.
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