创造性的法律解释何以可能?——基于哲学解释学的视角  

How is Productive Legal Interpretation Possible ? —Based on the Perspective of Philosophical Hermeneutics

作　　者：毛安翼 MAO Anyi(School of Marxism,Dongguan University of Technology,Dongguan 523808,China)

机构地区：[1]东莞理工学院马克思主义学院,广东东莞523808

出　　处：《东莞理工学院学报》2024年第6期1-6,19,共7页Journal of Dongguan University of Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究青年基金项目“党内法规解释方法论中的难点问题研究”(23YJC820024)。

摘　　要：哲学解释学对“创造性的法律解释何以可能”的回答,包含三个层次:从存在论上看,法律文本是意义构成物,只有在创造性的解释中才得以存在;从认识论上看,前见、想象力、判断力等是推动创造性的法律解释的力量;从创造性的法律解释与法律安定性的相容要求来看,对话游戏及在其中逐渐呈现的事情本身对解释活动具有制约作用,创造性的法律解释因这种制约作用而不会陷入解释的主观主义和相对主义。The answer of philosophical hermeneutics to“How productive legal interpretation is possible”contains three levels:from the ontological point of view,legal text is a meaningful structure,which can only exist in productive interpretation;From the epistemological point of view,prejudice is the power that stimulates productive legal interpretation.From the requirements for compatibility of productive legal interpretation and legal stability,dialogue games and the thing itself presented in them have a restricting effect on the interpretation activities,and the productive legal interpretation will not fall into the subjectivism and relativism of the interpretation because of this restricting effect.

关 键 词：创造性 意义构成物 文本 事情本身 

分 类 号：B089.2[哲学宗教—哲学理论]