A Careful Inspection on Priest's Recent View about Nothing  

对普里斯特近期无的理论的仔细检视

作　　者：Wenfang Wang 王文方(山东大学哲学与社会发展学院)

机构地区：[1]School of Philosophy and Social Development,Shandong University

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2024年第6期1-17,共17页Studies in Logic

基　　金：supported by China’s MOE project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities (22JJD720021);the project of National Social Science Foundation of China(23BZX123)。

摘　　要：Graham Priest has recently argued, in several of his papers and a book manuscript,for a view about nothing according to which nothing is paradoxical in several respects. The focus of the present paper is on three sub-claims of his view:(1) that nothing is an object,(w)that nothing is not an object, and(3) that everything grounds for its being on its being different from nothing. The author argues, both philosophically and formally, in this paper that Priest's arguments for the above sub-claims are not persuasive enough. Especially, the author argues that Priest's formal theory of nothing will suffer from a dilemma: either it will allow that there is a paradise of many nothings and therefore embrace an inflated ontology, or it will identify all nothings to be one and the same thing and therefore make everything ground everything in a certain sense.普里斯特近期在数篇文章及一本即将出版的书籍手稿中提出一个具有影响力的观点,他认为许多哲学家所说的无其实是具有多个矛盾特性的事物。本文的焦点限定在以下三个普里斯特对无的看法之上:(1)无是一个事物,(2)无也不是一个事物,以及(3)所有事物的存有都奠基在它不同于无这个事实之上。本文试图从哲学及形式证明的双重角度去论证普里斯特对上述三个看法所给出的哲学辩护在说服力上并不充足。本文特别论证说,普里斯特有关于无的形式化理论会陷入一个两难的困境:或者该理论会允许一个充满了类似于无的矛盾事物所组成的无之天堂,并因而拥抱一个过于膨胀的本体论,或者该理论会将该天堂中的所有矛盾的无都等同于同一个无,并因而使得每个事物在某个意义上都将其存有奠基于任何一个事物之上。

关 键 词：NOTHING FORMALLY FORMAL 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]