证监会随机抽查与股价同步性  

CSRC Random Inspection and Stock Price Synchronicity

作　　者：王雪 杨智 王建新 WANG Xue;YANG Zhi;WANG Jianxin

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2024年第10期43-60,共18页Financial Regulation Research

摘　　要：随机抽查制度是证监会规范监管行为、提高监管效能的一种新型监管方式。本文以我国沪深A股非金融行业上市公司为研究对象,利用双重差分模型分析了证监会随机抽查对股价同步性的影响。研究发现,随机抽查有利于降低上市公司的股价同步性。机制分析发现,信息披露质量和投资者关注在随机抽查对股价同步性的影响中发挥了中介作用。异质性分析发现,随机抽查对股价同步性的影响因地区法制环境、外部治理环境和公司内部控制质量不同而表现出显著差异。本文丰富了证监会随机抽查与资本市场信息效率间互动分析的研究成果,为考察监管方式有效性提供了增量证据。The random inspection system is a new regulatory approach adopted by CSRC to standardize regulatory behavior and improve regulatory efficiency.This paper takes non-financial listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares as the research object,and uses a difference-in in-difference model to analyze the impact of random inspection by CSRC on stock price synchronicity.Research has found that random inspection is beneficial in reducing the synchronicity of stock prices of listed companies.Mechanism analysis found that the quality of information disclosure and investor'attention play a mediating role in the impact of random inspection on stock price synchronicity.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of random inspection on stock price synchronicity varies significantly depending on the regional legal environment,external governance environment,and internal control quality of the company.This paper enriches the research results of the interaction analysis between the random inspection of CSRC and the information efficiency of the capital market,providing incremental evidence for examining the effectiveness of regulatory methods.

关 键 词：随机抽查制度 股价同步性 信息披露质量 投资者关注 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]