罗素式一元论的无知与前途  

Ignorance and Prospect in Russellian Monism

作　　者：刘皓滢 Liu Haoying(School of Philosophy,Fudan University Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《科学．经济．社会》2024年第5期41-54,共14页Science Economy Society

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题“意识整合信息理论的哲学基础研究”(2022EZX002);上海市白玉兰人才计划浦江项目“当代心灵哲学中的意识概念研究”(23PJC008)。

摘　　要：罗素式一元论被认为有望解决“心—身”问题。然而罗素式一元论中的有些要素是无法知晓的,如作为物理事物基本内在性质的“实质”,以及解释宏观事物性质的“组合原理”。如果该形而上学理论中的关键要素无法知晓,那么它将不能指导更多实质性的探究,因而成为一种“无用”的理论。这种沦于“无用”的危险可借由回顾经院哲学中的一种代表性想法——托马斯式质形论来理解:罗素式一元论和托马斯式质形论之间存在相似之处,且两者均表现出对其理论要素的无知。Russellian monism has been held by some contemporary philosophers as a promising approach to solving the mind-body problem.However,some elements of Russellian monism are unknowable,including the“quiddity”that serves as the fundamental intrinsic nature of physical things,and the principles postulated to explain the features of macro-level entities.If such key notions in the metaphysical framework of Russellian monism cannot be elucidated,then Russellian monism would not lead to further substantive investigations,and would thus degenerate into a“useless”account.To demonstrate how problematic such a prospect could be,I present a representative account in scholastic philosophy,namely Thomistic hylomorphism.I present the points of similarity between the two metaphysical accounts,and compare the ignorance that both suffer regarding their theoretical elements.

关 键 词：罗素式一元论 质形论 实质 组合问题 无知 

分 类 号：B0[哲学宗教—哲学理论]