演化博弈模型下我国光伏发电市场规模分析  

Analysis of China's Photovoltaic Power Generation Market Size based on the Evolutionary Game Model

作　　者：王林忻雨 WANG Lin-xin-yu(School of Statistics and Applied Mathematics,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui,233041,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学统计与应用数学学院,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《新疆师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2025年第1期63-71,共9页Journal of Xinjiang Normal University(Natural Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72374001)。

摘　　要：针对中国光伏发电市场规模情况,文章通过定义光伏原材料供应商、光伏原材料分销商、政府和光伏发电企业四方参与者的策略选择,利用复制动态方程构建四方演化博弈模型,分析在不同战略选择下每个参与者之间的收益和成本,并对微分方程稳定性原理和光伏市场中参与者策略之间的动态关系进行数据仿真。研究发现:(1)分销商需要筛选优质产品并提高鉴别能力,从而减少与不守规矩的生产商合作的可能性;(2)企业的维权行为对分销商和政府采取的政策具有积极影响;(3)政府在处理产品质量问题时需要采取多种措施进行综合治理。本研究有助于光伏产业参与者和政策制定者更好地了解市场动态,制定有效的政策和战略。For the market size of photovoltaic power generation in China,the benefits and costs of different strategic choices among each participant are analysed by defining the strategic choices of the four players,namely,photovoltaic raw material suppliers,photovoltaic raw material distributors,the government,and photovoltaic power producers,by constructing a four party evolutionary game model using replicated dynamic equations.The data simulation is carried out about the dynamic relationship between the strategies of the players in the photovoltaic market and the principle of stability of differential equations.It is found that:(1)Distributors need to screen for quality products and improve their ability to identify them so as to reduce the likelihood of cooperating with unruly producers;(2)Firms'rights defence behaviour positively affects the policies adopted by distributors and the government;(3)The government needs to adopt a variety of measures for comprehensive governance when dealing with product quality issues.This paper helps photovoltaic industry participants and policy makers to better understand market dynamics and formulate effective policies and strategies.

关 键 词：光伏发电市场 演化博弈 策略选择 可持续发展 

分 类 号：TM615[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]