城郊宅基地征收中“钉子户”与地方政府的博弈分析——兼论“一把尺子量到底”+“拆迁奖励”政策  

An Analysis of Game Between“Holdout”and Local Government in Suburban Residential Land Expropriation:On the Policy of“Equal Treatment”and“Demolition Rewards”

作　　者：孙秋鹏[1] SUN Qiu-peng(Institute of Marxism,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院马克思主义研究院,北京100732

出　　处：《山西师大学报（社会科学版）》2025年第1期97-107,共11页Journal of Shanxi Normal University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(21FJYB031)。

摘　　要：在城郊宅基地征收中,“钉子户”和地方政府的行为方式和策略选择将会直接影响土地增值收益分配的情况,并会影响土地征收数量、土地征收成本和社会福利水平。通过构建博弈模型可以得到如下结论:与普通农户相比,“钉子户”能够获得更多补偿的原因有:投入更多的博弈资源,能够忍受或有效规避地方政府惩罚造成的损失,具有博弈成本方面的优势;地方政府实行的“一把尺子量到底”+“拆迁奖励”政策是一种两阶段“最后通牒”策略,可以起到甄别“钉子户”和普通农户的作用,但也使得“钉子户”与地方政府之间的博弈不可避免;在“钉子户”与地方政府讨价还价过程中,与普通农户相比,“钉子户”具有更高的风险承受能力和讨价还价能力,能够获得更多的收益,但依然低于地方政府获得的份额;地方政府可以通过逐步试探的方式对两类农户进行甄别,因此不存在“钉子户”博弈给普通农户带来外部正效应的情况;“钉子户”和地方政府之间的博弈是为了争夺土地增值收益,博弈不是正和博弈或零和博弈而是负和博弈。In the suburban residential land expropriation,the behavior and strategy choice of“holdout”and local government will directly affect the distribution of land value-added income,the amount of land expropriation,land expropriation cost and social welfare level.By constructing the game model,we can draw the following conclu-sions.The reasons why“holdout”can obtain more compensation are that they invest more resistance resources,tol-erate or effectively avoid the losses caused by local government punishment,and thus have the advantage of resist-ance cost.The policies of“equal treatment”and“demolition reward”implemented by the local government are a two-stage“ultimatum”strategy,which can distinguish“holdout”from ordinary farmers,but it also makes the con-flicts between“holdout”and the local government inevitable.In the bargaining process between“holdout”and lo-cal government,compared with ordinary farmers,“holdouts”have higher risk tolerance and bargaining power,and can obtain more benefits,but they are still lower than the share obtained by local government.The local govern-ment can screen the two types of farmers by means of gradual exploration.Therefore,there is no situation that the“holdout”struggle brings external positive effects to ordinary farmers.The game between“holdout”and local gov-ernment is to compete for land value-added income.The game is not a positive sum game or a zero sum game,but rather a negative sum game.

关 键 词：宅地基 土地征收 钉子户 甄别 讨价还价 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]