考虑多重异质性的区域环境合作治理小世界网络演化博弈研究  

Research on small-world network evolutionary game of regional environmental cooperation governance with multiple heterogeneity

作　　者：范如国[1] 吴婷[1] FAN Ruguo;WU Ting(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2025年第1期140-154,共15页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标课题(20&ZD155);教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目(19JHQ091)。

摘　　要：由于环境污染具有负外部性,跨区域的环境问题不断涌现,因此,地方政府之间的合作治理是化解区域环境问题的重要路径,也是未来中国区域环境治理的发展方向。本文基于复杂网络理论、演化博弈理论,考虑地方政府间的偏好异质性和收入异质性,引入权重来刻画不同地区在合作中的贡献度的差异,并纳入收益分配机制、违约金机制,构建了加权NW小世界网络上地方政府间合作治理的演化博弈模型;通过数值仿真,分析了合作收益和成本、违约金、异质性三方面对网络合作水平的影响。研究结果表明:合作收益增加与合作成本降低均能促进地方政府合作治理网络向着帕累托最优方向演化,且当合作收益和合作成本到达一定水平时,经济发展水平低的地区对合作收益和合作成本的变化更为敏感。适当的违约金可以促进地方政府合作行为的演化,但违约金只是起到保障和制约的作用,仅提高违约金难以促进合作策略全扩散。节点异质性对于提高地方政府区域合作治理水平是一把双刃剑。At present,regional environmental problems arise constantly due to the negative externality of environmental pollution.Cooperative governance provides an effective solution to regional environmental problems.However,the division of administrative jurisdiction causes the local governments in different regions to act separately,prioritize local interests,and lack the motivation for cooperation.In addition,there are differences between various regions in the level of economic development,the objectives of governance,the willingness to cooperate,and the importance level of environmental governance,all of which increase the difficulty of cooperation in regional environmental governance.Therefore,it is essential to explore how to balance the interests of different regions,clarify the motivation and mechanism of the collaboration of local governments in environmental governance,and solve the dilemma of collective action.At present,there are still few studies applying complex networks to describe the relationship between local governments or giving consideration to the heterogeneity of preferences and incomes among local governments,as well as the resulting differences in cooperative contributions.Therefore,it is proposed in this study to construct an evolutionary game model of cooperative governance among local governments based on the weighted NW small world network.Based on the above analysis,this paper is structured as follows.In section one,an analysis is conducted on three major problems facing the practice of regional environmental governance due to the negative externalities of environmental pollution.Then,it is proposed that the governance relationship between local governments can be abstracted into a small world network.Besides,an analysis is conducted as to the heterogeneity of local governments and its impact on environmental governance behavior.In section two,the weighted NW small world network is applied to construct an evolutionary game model of cooperative governance among local governments.Despite the r

关 键 词：复杂网络 演化博弈 区域环境 合作治理 异质性 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]