分割董事席位的上市公司股东协议问题研究  

A Study on Listed Companies’Shareholder Agreements on the Division of Board Seats

作　　者：沈朝晖[1] 刘向嫒 Shen Zhaohui;Liu Xiangai

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100084 [2]易方达基金管理有限公司,广东广州510620

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2025年第1期27-37,52,共12页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“数字经济驱动下公司法规范的调适研究”(23BFX085)。

摘　　要：我国境内上市公司版本的“湖畔合伙人”协议约定董事席位提名权的股东协议,已成为一种A股上市公司控制权结构的新形式。本文针对其三方面问题展开研究:特征方面,A股上市公司协议类型上以横向协议为主、场景上以控制权变更为主、主体上以控制权变更前后“双控人”为主、内容上以董事会安排为主;效力方面,以上市公司董事席位分割条款为例,本文为股东协议提供了一个具有普适性的法律效力分析框架,由合同效力、组织法效力和事后可履行性三个阶层构成;监管方面,本文认为上市公司董事席位分割条款不应作为一致行动人或共同控制人的单一认定标准。The domestic version of the“Hupan Partners”agreement in China’s listed companies—shareholder agreements stipulating the nomination rights of board seats—has developed into a new form of control structure in A-share listed companies.This paper conducts research on three aspects of this issue.In terms of characteristics,the agreement types of A-share listed companies are mainly horizontal agreements.The agreements are commonly utilized in scenarios involving changes in control,with the main parties as the“dual controllers”before and after the change in control and the content mainly focused on board arrangements.In terms of legal validity,this paper takes clauses on the division of board seats in listed companies as an example and proposes a universal legal validity analysis framework for shareholder agreements.This framework consists of three levels:contractual validity,corporate law validity,and post-facto enforceability.From the regulatory perspective,the paper posits that clauses on the division of board seats in listed companies should not be used as the sole criterion for identifying concerted action parties or joint controllers.

关 键 词：股东协议 私序治理 上市公司 董事提名 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]