秦汉“鬻爵”“卖官”的边际效用与官爵体制的变迁  

The Marginal Utility of “Selling Titles” and “Selling Official Positions”in the Qin and Han Dynasties and the Changes in the Official Position and Title System

作　　者：凌文超 LING Wenchao

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学历史学院

出　　处：《社会科学》2024年第12期45-56,共12页Journal of Social Sciences

摘　　要：秦汉时期制度性鬻爵卖官经历了以鬻爵为主到以卖官为主两个阶段,所售卖的爵、官先后主要是爵级、爵位(日益虚化)和任官资格、候选官、官府属吏。秦汉统治者有意将鬻爵卖官限制在卿级以下爵位以及无行政主导权的进身之阶、低级属吏的范围内,可随着鬻爵卖官边际效用递减,不得不一步步放开厚爵高官的买卖,导致政治腐败日益严重。鬻爵卖官虽然能有效应对财政困难,但违背了爵功官能的基本原则,即使只是权宜之计,也必然败坏政治风气。The institutional sale of titles and official positions in the Qin and Han dynasties went through two stages: from mainly selling titles to mainly selling official positions. The titles and officials positions sold successively were mainly ranks, titles(increasingly empty), qualifications for appointment, candidate officials, and government subordinates. The Qin and Han rulers intentionally restricted the sale of titles and official positions to titles below the Dashuzhang, as well as to candidate officials and lower ranking officials which had no administrative power. However, as the marginal utility of selling titles and official positions decreased, the government had to gradually open up the sale of high-ranking officials, which led to increasingly serious political corruption. Although selling titles and official positions could effectively help to deal with financial difficulties, it violated the basic principle of granting titles according to merit and positions according to ability. Even if it was only a stopgap measure, it would inevitably corrupt the political atmosphere.

关 键 词：秦汉 鬻爵 卖官 边际效用 官爵体制 

分 类 号：K232[历史地理—历史学]