Regulating Dual-Class Share Structures in China:A Comparative Perspective  

作　　者：WANG Yitian 

机构地区：[1]University of International of Business and Economics,Beijing,China

出　　处：《US-China Law Review》2024年第9期449-457,共9页美中法律评论（英文版）

摘　　要：During this revision of the Company Law,China1 has responded at the legal level to diversified shareholding structures and provided basic regulations for dual-class share structures.Compared to other regions with extensive practices in dual-class share structures,China still has much room for improvement in regulating them.Examining the pros and cons of dual-class share structures reveals their efficiency regarding voting rights and other benefits.However,it is crucial to recognize potential issues,such as increased agency costs and the possible misuse of voting rights that these structures may cause.When summarizing international regulatory approaches to dual-class share structures,we can categorize them into autonomous and central regulatory models.China tends to adopt a centralized regulatory model but should learn from the experiences of autonomous regulatory models to enhance its system.

关 键 词：dual-class structure autonomous regulating model centralized regulatory model fiduciary duty 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]