低碳背景下基于四方演化博弈的航运碳减排研究  

Research on the Quadripartite Evolutionary Game of Shipping Carbon Emission Reduction

作　　者：赵建鑫 张桂涛 ZHAO Jian-xin;ZHANG Gui-tao(Business College,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266061,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266061

出　　处：《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》2024年第4期74-83,共10页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(批准号:19BGL091)资助。

摘　　要：为探究航运碳减排的各方主体决策,降低航运碳排放量,建立了一个包含上级政府、地方政府、港口企业和船舶公司的四方演化博弈模型,应用演化博弈理论探讨四方之间的博弈互动和在稳定策略下的博弈进程,利用Matlab软件对四方的演化轨迹进行数值模拟分析,从而得出各参数对主体决策的影响。研究结果表明,上级政府不必严格监管,地方政府可积极落实且港口企业支持政策的落实实施,船公司采用绿色技术来降低碳排放,由此形成良好的制约形式;当政策落实成本过高时,地方政府落实意愿逐渐降低;随着地方政府对船公司和港口企业补贴的提高,港口企业对于政府的支持度会变高,船公司因减轻了自身负担而采用绿色技术的意愿也在提高。To understand how to reduce shipping carbon emissions and the key decision-making processes involved,a game model was created.This model comprised four parts:the higher-level government,local government,port businesses,and shipping companies.Using game theory,how these four parts interacted and how they arrived at a stable strategy were examined.By using Matlab software,the evolution trajectory of the four sides was numerically simulated and analyzed,and the influence of each parameter on the decision of the main body was obtained.The research revealed that the local government would strive to implement policies when the higher-level government does not require strict supervision.Port businesses will support these policies,and shipping companies will use green technology to reduce emissions.This creates a good situation for everyone.But,if it costs too much to carry out the policies,the local government might not want to do it as much.If the local government gives more money to shipping companies and port businesses,these businesses will be more likely to support the government.And shipping companies will be more likely to use green technology because it will be less of a financial burden for them.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 碳减排 港口航运 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]