绿色博弈:水环境治理PPP项目运营中的企业投机与政府应对  

Green Game:Corporate Speculation and Government Response in Operation of PPP Projects for Water Environment Governance

作　　者：黄洵 李宗耀 HUANG Xun;LI Zongyao(Sichuan Open University,Sichuan 610000,China;Chongqing University,Chongqing 401331,China)

机构地区：[1]四川开放大学,四川成都610000 [2]重庆大学,重庆401331

出　　处：《北京工业职业技术学院学报》2025年第1期33-38,共6页Journal of Beijing Polytechnic College

基　　金：2023年四川省科技计划重点研发项目(2023YFS0375);四川开放大学2020-2021年度校立重点科研项目(KTKYC2020016Z)。

摘　　要：在“健全现代环境治理体系”与“绿色发展”战略导向下,水环境治理领域PPP项目被视为推动可持续发展的重要手段。然而,PPP项目运营过程中企业投机行为已成为影响项目成功的关键因素,亟须政府采取有效的监管策略。通过构建政府与企业间的演化博弈模型,对其进行机理分析和可视化数值仿真与验证,揭示监管与投机之间的内在联系及动态变化规律,提出减少企业投机概率的系统方法,为政策制定者提供理论依据和实践指导。Under the strategic guidance of“improving the modern environmental governance system”and“green development”,PPP projects in the field of water environment governance are regarded as an important means to promote sustainable development.However,in the process of PPP projects operation,corporate speculation has become a key factor affecting the success of these projects,and it is urgent for the government to adopt effective regulatory strategies.By constructing the evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises,the mechanism analysis and visual numerical simulation and verification are carried out to reveal the internal relationship and dynamic change law between regulation and speculation,and a systematic method to reduce the probability of corporate speculation is proposed to provide theoretical basis and practical guidance for policy makers.

关 键 词：水环境治理 PPP项目监管 环境治理体系 企业投机 演化博弈 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]