无实际控制人公司选择会计师事务所的偏好分析  

Analysis of Preferences of Companies without Controlling Shareholders in Choosing Accounting Firms

作　　者：时晓静 Xiaojing Shi(East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang,Jiangxi,330000,China)

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《经济管理学刊(中英文版)》2024年第4期225-233,共9页Economic Management Journal

摘　　要：基于企业年报中披露的实际控制人信息,利用2017-2022年我国A股上市公司中有实际控制人公司与无实际控制人公司数据,验证了无实际控制人公司是否会考虑利用高质量审计这一机制来减少经理代理行为。研究发现,无实际控制人选择“十大”及“四大”的比例更高,出具非标意见的比例也高于所有A股公司。这说明无实际控制人公司相对于有实际控制人公司有较高的审计需求,验证了理论中的机制。因此本文建议完善股权分散制度,实现公司适度股权分离,有利于提高对高质量审计的需求。Based on the actual controller information disclosed in the annual reports of enterprises,this paper uses the data of companies with actual controllers and those without actual controllers in A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2022 to verify whether companies without actual controllers consider using high-quality auditing as a mechanism to reduce managerial agency costs.The study finds that companies without actual controllers are more likely to choose the"big four"auditors and the top ten auditors,and they are more likely to issue non-standard audit opinions than all A-share companies.This indicates that companies without actual controllers have higher auditing needs compared to those with actual controllers,verifying the mechanism in the theory.Therefore,this paper suggests that improving the equity dispersal system and achieving moderate equity separation can help increase the demand for high-quality auditing.

关 键 词：无实际控制人 事务所选择 股权分离 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]