电力工程EPC总承包商与分包商的经济博弈分析  

Analysis of Economic Game Between EPC General Contractor and Subcontractor in Power Engineering

作　　者：邓春林 DENG Chunlin(Zhuhai Electric Power Design Institute Co.,Ltd.,Zhuhai 519000,China)

机构地区：[1]珠海电力设计院有限公司,广东珠海519000

出　　处：《电工技术》2024年第23期100-103,共4页Electric Engineering

摘　　要：运用博弈论对EPC总承包商和分包商的行为动机进行了研究,分析了EPC总承包商与分包商合作过程中可能出现的各种博弈模型,揭示了囚徒困境、鹿的陷阱和单方面承诺的本质。最后,介绍了信用积累和长期利益,这将在反复博弈中影响总承包商和分包商的决策,并将达到帕累托效率和稳定合作关系的“双赢”。研究可为EPC模式的健康发展和施工企业的合作关系决策提供重要依据。In this paper,game theory is employed to conduct an in-depth study on the behavioral motivations of EPC general contractors and subcontractors,and a systematic analysis is made of various game models that may occur during the cooperation process between EPC general contractors and subcontractors.It also reveals the essence of the"Prisoner′s Dilemma","Stag Hunt"and unilateral commitment.Finally,this paper introduces credit accumulation and long-term interests,which will affect the decision-making of both the general contractor and the subcontractor in repeated games and achieve a"win-win"situation of Pareto efficiency and stable cooperative relationship.This study provides an important basis for the healthy development of the EPC model and the decision-making of cooperative relationships for construction enterprises.

关 键 词：EPC 博弈分析 总承包商 分包商 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]