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作 者:米传民[1] 李明珠 王苏阳 韩福松 谭清美[1,3] MI Chuanmin;LI Mingzhu;WANG Suyang;HAN Fusong;TAN Qingmei(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China;AVIC Aviation Simulation System Co.,Ltd.,Shanghai 200241,China;Jiangsu Province Civil-military Integration Industrial Development Research Center,Nanjing 211106,China)
机构地区:[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]中航航空模拟系统有限公司,上海200241 [3]江苏军民融合发展研究基地,江苏南京211106
出 处:《运筹与管理》2024年第11期65-71,共7页Operations Research and Management Science
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(20&ZD127);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(NJ2022031)。
摘 要:军民融合背景下的国防知识产权合作是由军工企业和民用企业共同投入优势资源,合作研发满足军民双方需求的国防知识产权,促进国防建设和国民经济的双向发展。本研究构建以军工企业、民用企业和政府为参与主体的国防知识产权合作演化博弈模型,分析三方博弈主体的演化稳定策略,并通过数值仿真探究影响国防知识产权合作稳定性的重要因素。研究结果表明,国防知识产权合作稳定性与违约惩罚呈正相关,与信息沟通成本呈负相关,与收益分配系数呈“倒U”型相关。政府补贴和惩罚对合作稳定性产生重要影响,且军工企业对政府政策和违约惩罚变动的反应更加敏感,民用企业对信息沟通成本变动的反应更加敏感,并确定了最优博弈策略(坚持合作,坚持合作,监管)状态稳定时的收益分配系数和政府补贴系数的变化区间。最后为提高合作稳定性提出相应的对策建议。The defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration is a joint investment of superior resources from both military and civilian enterprises.The cooperation aims to develop the defense intellectual property that meets their needs,which in turn promotes the two-way development of national defense construction and national economy.How to encourage and deepen the defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration,and solve the problems such as unclear ownership of property rights,barriers to information communication,and disputes in interest distribution of cooperation are crucial to promoting the in-depth development of civil-military integration.Current studies on defense intellectual property cooperation are limited to qualitative analysis,lacking the construction of the evolutionary game model on defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration.Therefore,we explore the cooperation mechanism of defense intellectual property in the context of civil-military integration by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model with military firms,civilian firms,and the government as game subjects.Several typical characteristics of civil-military integration,such as the national defense benefits,risk aversion,and information communication costs are included in the tripartite evolutionary game model.The experimental analysis process is as follows:First,we clarify the ownership of defense intellectual property and put forward hypotheses on the cooperation.Second,we construct the tripartite benefit matrix of the evolutionary game model to establish the replicator dynamics equations.Third,according to the replicator dynamics equations,we obtain the Jacobian matrix and obtain the eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix.Finally,we analyze the evolutionary stability strategies and investigate the critical factors affecting the stability of cooperation through numerical simulation.We discuss the evolutionary s
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