政府环境规制下零售商与制造商产销决策的博弈研究  

Game Study on Production and Marketing Decision between Retailers and Manufacturers under GovernmentEnvironmental Regulation

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作  者:段方龙 董雨[1] DUAN Fanglong;DONG Yu(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)

机构地区:[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出  处:《运筹与管理》2024年第11期84-89,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71973001)。

摘  要:考虑消费者低碳偏好,研究在碳交易政策下如何有效对二级供应链中的零售商与制造商实施环境规制策略。本文构建了由政府、零售商和制造商组成的低碳产销系统演化博弈模型,探索了三方主体的策略稳定性、影响机制及演化路径。研究发现:零售商与制造商选择低碳产销策略组合的意愿会随着碳交易价格的升高而增强;前期,碳交易政策发挥作用有限,政府的低碳补贴、偷排惩罚可以引导零售商、制造商的生产经营行为;后期,政府在正、负两个方向上的激励减弱,由消费者低碳偏好决定的低碳产销敏感系数成为推动低碳供应链稳定发展的重要因素。With the continuous improvement of the level of global industrialization,the large amount of greenhouse gas emissions has led to an increasingly prominent climate problem.Facing a severe environmental pressure,on the one hand,the national carbon emission trading market has been officially launched,which combines low-carbon compensation and high-emission constraints.On the other hand,the improvement of environmental protection awareness makes consumers more inclined to low-carbon consumption,which provides impetus for the generation of low-carbon operation models of supply chain production and sales enterprises.However,the benefits and costs of carbon emission reduction in the supply chain are difficult to match,and the existence of positive external effects further hinders the smooth implementation of low-carbon supply chains.Therefore,how to use the government’s environmental regulation measures to encourage sellers and manufacturers to interact and restrict each other through the carbon trading market and product market is the key to exploring the stable development of low-carbon supply chains in the context of consumers’low-carbon preferences.Based on the fact that the conditions of complete rationality and complete information of traditional game participants are difficult to meet,the evolutionary game theory,which is assumed to be more realistic,is used by more and more scholars to analyze the carbon emission reduction behavior of supply chain member companies under the carbon trading mechanism.Based on the bounded rationality assumption of the game subject,this paper accurately describes the behavior of the participating players by setting different parameters,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the government,retailers and manufacturers,and obtains a replicative dynamic system.This paper first analyzes the strategic stability of a single player with the stability principle of differential equations to study the relationship between the strategic choice of a single player and the

关 键 词:碳交易 环境规制 低碳供应链 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F420[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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