基于演化博弈的稀土上游企业碳减排策略研究  

Research on Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy of Rare Earth Upstream Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：马越峰[1] 李通 MA Yuefeng;LI Tong(School of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia University of Science and Technology,Baotou 014010,China)

机构地区：[1]内蒙古科技大学经济与管理学院,内蒙古包头014010

出　　处：《西安文理学院学报(自然科学版)》2025年第1期109-117,共9页Journal of Xi’an University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(22YJA630081);横向项目(2022007):“北方稀土全产业链‘十四五’碳达峰碳中和技术路线图”

摘　　要：为探究地方政府在稀土上游企业碳减排生产决策中的影响机理,构建了地方政府和稀土上游企业的动态演化博弈模型,分析了不同情形下的博弈主体策略,并运用MATLAB进行数值仿真和灵敏度分析.研究结果如下:(1)若地方政府实施碳交易、低碳技术补贴、碳惩罚等政策,博弈系统可演化出不同的均衡状态,演化结果不受双方初始策略选择的影响,不同情形下的演化稳定策略分别为E_(1)(0,0)、E_(2)(0,1)和E_(3)(1,0)点,其中E_(3)(1,0)表示稀土上游企业重视碳减排生产,地方政府宽松监管,是双方博弈的理想情景.(2)灵敏度分析结果表明:(1)碳交易价格是影响博弈主体选择的决定性因素,即碳交易价格会直接影响博弈结果,当碳交易价格较高时,稀土上游企业会自发地选择重视碳减排生产.(2)与碳交易价格相比,补贴对稀土上游企业策略选择的影响较小,当碳交易市场低迷时,需要较大的补贴力度才能产生显著效果.(3)提高碳惩罚金额,可以有效降低稀土上游企业向不重视碳减排策略的演化速度,但无法改变其策略选择.(4)补贴和碳惩罚与稀土上游企业选择重视碳减排生产策略的意愿呈正相关,建立适当的补贴和碳惩罚机制能够加速稀土上游企业的绿色低碳转型.据此,结合模型结果与关键因素影响分析,从碳政策、碳核查体系、能源结构和低碳技术等角度提出对策建议.To explore the influence mechanism of local governments on the carbon emission reduction decisions in the rare earth upstream industry,a dynamic evolutionary game model between local government and rare earth upstream enterprises was constructed.The strategies of both game participants under different scenarios were analyzed,and numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses were conducted using MATLAB.The research results are as follows:(1)If the local government implements policies such as carbon emission trading rights,low-carbon technology subsidies,and carbon penalties,the game system can evolve into different equilibrium states.The evolution results are not influenced by the initial strategy choices of both participants.The evolutionarily stable strategies under different scenarios are represented by points E_(1)(0,0),E_(2)(0,1),and E_(3)(1,0).Among them,E_(3)(1,0)represents the ideal scenario for both participants in the game where rare earth upstream enterprises prioritize carbon emission reduction production and the local government adopts lenient regulation.(2)Sensitivity analysis results indicate:①Carbon trading price is the decisive factor influencing the strategy choices of the game participants.When the carbon trading price is high,rare earth upstream enterprises are more likely to prioritize carbon emission reduction production.②Compared to carbon trading prices,subsidies have a relatively minor impact on the strategy choices of rare earth upstream enterprises.In a sluggish carbon trading market,significant subsidies are required to achieve noticeable effects.③Increasing the amount of carbon penalties can effectively reduce the rate at which rare earth upstream enterprises evolve towards strategies that do not prioritize carbon emission reduction.However,it does not change their strategy choices.④Subsidies and carbon penalties are positively correlated with the willingness of rare earth upstream enterprises to prioritize carbon emission reduction production.Establishing appropriate subsidy

关 键 词：稀土上游企业 碳减排 演化博弈 碳交易 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]