摩尔和维特根斯坦论外部世界怀疑论  

Moore and Wittgenstein on Scepticism Concerning the Existence of an External World

作　　者：王小塞 罗诗曼(译) Sebastian Sunday Grève

机构地区：[1]北京大学外国哲学研究所 [2]北京大学哲学系(宗教学系) [3]中欧大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学门》2024年第2期268-284,共17页Beida Journal of Philosophy

基　　金：2020年度北京大学学科建设项目“智能思维与行动的基础”(7101302578)的资助

摘　　要：本文从逻辑或语义的角度回应了关于外部世界存在的怀疑论。具体而言,本文论证了任何对外部世界存在的怀疑都是可证伪的,同时,任何看似质疑外部世界存在却不可证伪的论题都是无稽之谈(nonsense),因其必须依赖于某些逻辑上不可能的主张。此外,本文认为这一回应正是摩尔和维特根斯坦试图提出的,尽管他们未详细论述。This paper attempts to flesh out the response to scepticism about the existence of an external world that,it is argued,both Moore and Wittgenstein were working towards but left unfinished.The paper develops an account of why and how Moore was correct as far as he got.It is further argued that it was Witt-genstein who supplied at least the materials necessary to explain the reason——which Moore still owed——why any real doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false,but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is in fact nonsense,in sofa as it must rely on the assertion of something that,in Moore’s view as well as Wittgenstein’s,is logically impossible.

关 键 词：摩尔 维特根斯坦 外部世界怀疑论 

分 类 号：B083[哲学宗教—哲学理论]