数字市场竞争的自我优待与反垄断研究进展  

Research Progress on Self-preferencing in Digital Market Competition and Antitrust

作　　者：孟昌[1,2] 张济宗 MENG Chang;ZHANG Jizong(Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing,China)

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学经济学院,100048 [2]北京工商大学数字经济研究院,100048

出　　处：《经济学动态》2024年第12期141-157,共17页Economic Perspectives

基　　金：北京市社科基金重点项目“网络平台企业横向集中的市场势力及其反竞争行为治理”(21GLA014)。

摘　　要：数字市场中既销售第三方商家产品,也销售自己产品的平台企业,利用其基于算法技术、数据收集能力和网络外部性优势的算法市场势力“优待”自己的产品,引发了自我优待行为可能损害公平竞争和社会福利的担忧,有关反垄断立法与司法判例也引起了争议。本文在评述不同类型自我优待行为理论研究和实证文献以及反垄断立法和司法判例的基础上,总结了自我优待行为的主要类型及其行为特征,传统企业自我优待行为与平台企业自我优待行为的区别,以及搜索排序类自我优待行为与赞助排名的区别。重点评述了搜索排序类自我优待和利用第三方数据类自我优待行为可能导致的竞争损害、对社会福利的影响及救济。在分析欧美数字市场竞争立法与执法中对具有典型性的“谷歌比价购物案”中“优待”行为的规制与学界争议后,本文给出了基本共识和主流观点。规制自我优待行为应适用于合理性原则,裁定应基于效果分析、竞争损害和社会福利后果分析,慎用乃至不用本身违法原则。最后是关于自我优待行为及其规制的研究展望。Platform companies in digital markets that sell both third-party merchants'products and their own products often leverage their“market power of algorithmic”-derived from advantages in algorithmic technology,data collection capabilities,and network externalities-to prefer their products.When there is competition between a platform's own products(or products within the same ecosystem)and those offered by other entities on the platform,the platform's use of algorithms to prefer or favor its own products may harm fair competition and social welfare.This has raised widespread concerns and become a key issue in recent frontier research of industrial organization economics and law economics.This paper first categorizes self-preferencing behaviors based on the relevant provisions of the EU Digital Markets Act(DMA)and existing literature.It distinguishes between self-preferencing in platform transactions and traditional business self-preferencing.It further differentiates between search-ranking self-preferencing and sponsored-ranking selfpreferencing.Regarding the motivations for self-preferencing behaviors,this paper focuses on the much-discussed issue of search-ranking self-preferencing,discussing its welfare effects and potential remedies from the perspective of whether commissions are charged and the type of platform in question.The impact of search-ranking self-preferencing behaviors on competition,consumer surplus,and total welfare is uncertain and should therefore be subject to scrutiny before being addressed by antitrust regulation.Directly prohibiting or remedying self-preferencing behaviors based on the illegal per se principle can harm innovation and,in some cases,reduce both competition and welfare.Existing research on the consequences of self-preferencing behaviors that involve the use of third-party data has produced uncertain judgments regarding their impact on competition,consumer surplus,and overall social welfare.Selfpreferencing behaviors that involve third-party data are not always harmful.This imp

关 键 词：自我优待 数字市场竞争 竞争损害 谷歌比价购物案 数字市场法 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]