平台数字内容产品免费体验的信号效应研究  

Research on the Signaling Effects of Free Experience in Platform Digital Contents

作　　者：刘源 喻迎 陈宏民[3] Liu Yuan;Yu Ying;Chen Hongmin(School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China;Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,Macao Polytechnic University,Macao 999078,China;Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 201406,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]澳门理工大学人文及社会科学学院,中国澳门特别行政区999078 [3]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海201406

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第12期206-214,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金第75批面上项目(2024M750571);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72472101);教育部哲社重大课题攻关项目(20JZD010)。

摘　　要：在平台诸多数字内容产品中,免费体验的策略得到广泛的推行,例如软件试用、游戏试玩、电子书试读等。免费体验能帮助用户切身地体验到产品,有益于减少产品质量信息的不对称。传统的信号博弈模型只包括信号发送方和接收方,而在本文的模型中,作为中介的平台也参与到了博弈中。研究表明:在重复购买的环境下,平台的加入将有益于免费体验发挥信号效应,分离均衡更有可能形成。当平台不参与博弈时,若免费体验的质量不能传递信息,那么免费体验也不能产生信号效应;在平台加入博弈后,即使免费体验的质量不能传递信息,平台也可以通过向厂商收取一定门槛的广告费,来促进分离均衡的产生。本文为数字内容厂商的市场决策以及平台的管理策略提供了有益启示。In digital platforms,it is often challenging to provide users with comprehensive information about the quality of digital content products.To address this issue,many firms have adopted strategies that involve offer⁃ing partial product content for free experience(FE).On video streaming platforms,users can watch certain content for free;music platforms provide extensive libraries of trial tracks;game platforms offer free trial ver⁃sions of some games,and e-book platforms allow users to access free sample chapters.The FE strategy allows users to experience the product firsthand,which is beneficial in reducing information asymmetry regarding product quality.Traditional signaling game models typically involve only the signaling sender and receiver.In this paper,the platform,acting as an intermediary,is incorporated into the signaling game as an additional participant.A microeconomic theoretical model is constructed based on the signaling theory to analyze the signaling effects of firms providing FE to users on platforms.Some typical features of FE are incorporated into a signaling game model,with a particular focus on scenarios where the quality of FE fails to convey informa⁃tion.By comparing equilibrium solutions in cases where the platform does not participate in the game and where the platform does participate in the game,the influence of the platform is investigated as an intermediary in the signaling game.The managerial insights of this paper include two main points.Firstly,platforms should establish a screening mechanism,imposing certain advertising fees thresholds on firms.This would benefit users in distinguishing firms with varying levels of quality and mitigate the issue of information asymmetry regarding product quality.Secondly,platforms should incentivize firms to maintain consistency in the quality of their trial products and final products.When there is a significant disparity between the quality of trial products and final products in the market,users will no longer rely on the quality of free tr

关 键 词：免费体验 平台 数字内容 信号效应 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]