共同机构所有权与关联方交易  

Common Agency Ownership and Related Party Transactions

作　　者：吴秋生[1] 任晓姝 WU Qiusheng;REN Xiaoshu(Accounting School,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyaun 030006,China;School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学会计学院,山西太原030006 [2]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《经济与管理》2025年第1期76-84,共9页Economy and Management

摘　　要：基于共同机构所有权的信息效应与垄断效应,以2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究共同机构所有权对企业关联方交易的影响。研究发现:共同机构所有权使企业的关联方交易显著增加。共同机构所有权对企业关联方交易的影响在共同机构所有权较大、同行业势力较大、竞争度较小的情况下更显著,增加企业关联方交易是共同机构所有权实现利益最大化的选择。经一系列稳健性检验后,结论依然成立。进一步研究发现,共同机构所有权可以通过增加关联方交易降低企业会计信息质量,并获得更多超额利润,与理论分析相一致。Based on the information effect and monopoly effect of joint institution ownership,the impact of joint institution ownership on related transactions was studied from the A-share listed companies in 2007—2020.The study found that joint institutional ownership has significantly increased the related party transactions of enterprises,and the conclusion remains true after a series of robustness tests.The influence of joint institutional ownership on enterprise-related transactions is more significant in the case of large joint institutional ownership,greater influence in the same industry,and less competition.The increase of enterprise related transactions is the choice to maximize the interests of the ownership of joint institutions.Further research has found that the co-ownership of joint institutions can reduce the quality of enterprise accounting information and obtain more excess profits by increasing related party transactions,which is consistent with the theoretical analysis.

关 键 词：共同机构所有权 关联方交易 公司治理 会计信息质量 机构投资者 

分 类 号：F123.9[经济管理—世界经济] F276.1