欧盟《外国补贴条例》的执法裁量权:规则特征、合法性风险与中国应对  

Enforcement Discretion under EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation:Regulatory Features,Legitimacy Risk and China’s Strategy

作　　者：阮淑慧 RUAN Shuhui

机构地区：[1]武汉大学国际法研究所 [2]上海WTO事务咨询中心

出　　处：《武大国际法评论》2024年第5期143-157,共15页Wuhan University International Law Review

摘　　要：作为全球范围内首项规制外国政府补贴本土经济活动的立法措施,《外国补贴条例》不仅在规制范围上呈现由货物贸易向投资并购等多元国际经济活动扩展的趋势,还在执法裁量权上表现出一系列新特征。该条例通过补贴行为的泛归因性、因果关系的模糊性、救济措施的灵活性以及依职权调查的主动性等特征,使欧盟执法机构获得了相较于《SCM协定》和欧盟国家援助制度更大的执法裁量权。此种基于立法授权的执法裁量权在实践中或将违反世界贸易组织《服务贸易总协定》的国民待遇、最惠国待遇及市场准入等条款。《外国补贴条例》执法裁量权的扩张将对中国产生一系列负面影响,中国企业与政府应各自做好补贴信息与合规管理的预防性措施,在遭遇执法裁量权滥用的不公正待遇时,可从企业层面的法律诉讼及国家层面的争端解决机制寻求救济。As the first legislation worldwide against foreign government subsidies in local economic activities,the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation(FSR)not only extends the regulatory scope from trade in goods to various international economic activities including concentration and public procurement,but also gains new features in its enforcement discretion.These new features include“pan-attribution”of subsidization,ambiguity of causal relations,flexibility of redressive measures and ex officio initiation of market investigation,which grant EU Commission with greater enforcement discretion than the SCM Agreement and the EU state aid regime.This enforcement discretion granted by legislation,if abused,is likely to violate the provisions of national treatment,most-favored nation treatment and market access under the General Agreement on Trade in Services(GATS).The expansion of FSR enforcement discretion could especially generate negative impact on China.Chinese companies and the government should respectively take preventive measures in terms of subsidy information and compliance management.In the event of unfair treatment caused by abuse of enforcement discretion,remedies may be sought from local judicial remedies at the enterprise level as well as from dispute settlement mechanisms at the national level.

关 键 词：外国补贴条例 执法裁量权 SCM协定 国家援助制度 服务贸易总协定 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]