Exit options sustain altruistic punishment and decrease the second-order free-riders,but it is not a panacea  

作　　者：Chen SHEN Zhao SONG Lei SHI Jun TANIMOTO Zhen WANG 

机构地区：[1]Faculty of Engineering Sciences,Kyushu University,Fukuoka 816-8580,Japan [2]School of Statistics and Mathematics,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221,China [3]School of Computing,Engineering and Digital Technologies,Teesside University,Middlesbrough TS1,UK [4]School of Artificial Intelligence,OPtics and ElectroNics(iOPEN),Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi’an 710072,China

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2025年第1期275-288,共14页中国科学(信息科学)(英文版)

基　　金：supported by National Key R&D Program of China(Grant No.2022YFE0112300);National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars(Grant No.62025602);support from JSPS Postdoctoral Fellowship Program for Foreign Researchers(Grant No.P21374);Accompanying Grant-in-aid for Scientific Research from JSPS KAKENHI(Grant No.JP 22F31374);National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.11931015)to Chen SHEN as a co-investigator;National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.U22B2036,11931015);Major Program of National Fund of Philosophy and Social Science of China(Grants Nos.22&ZD158,22VRCO49)to Lei SHI;Key Technology Research and Development Program of Science and Technology-Scientific and Technological Innovation Team of Shaanxi Province(Grant No.2020TD-013);XPLORER PRIZE.to Zhen WANG;Grant-in-aid for Scientific Research from JSPS KAKENHI(Grants Nos.JP 20H02314,JP 23K28189,JP23H03499)awarded to Jun TANIMOTO。

摘　　要：Why do humans punish free riders at their own expense?This behavior represents an evolutionary puzzle in human societies.This study explores the role of exit strategies in fostering altruistic punishment within evolutionary game theory.We extend the traditional prisoner’s dilemma model by incorporating exiters,players who opt out for a small payoff while nullifying their opponent’s payoff,and altruistic punishers who cooperate and punish non-cooperators.Our findings indicate that in well-mixed populations,exiters destabilize defection but do not promote altruistic punishment.In social networks,however,exiters enable altruistic punishment via cyclic dominance among altruistic punishers,defectors,and exiters.Notably,this cyclic dominance is sensitive to exit payoffs;adjustments can lead to cyclic dominance of non-punishing cooperators,defectors,and exiters,or to a bi-stable state between these two types of cyclic dominance.These results highlight the nuanced impact of exiters on altruistic punishment,emphasizing the need for careful incentivization of exit behavior.While exiters can support altruistic punishment in networked populations,their effectiveness is not a panacea and is highly sensitive to exit payoffs,indicating limits to the voluntary participation mechanism.

关 键 词：evolutionary game theory altruistic punishment COEXISTENCE cyclic dominance bi-stable 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]