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作 者:庄家炽 罗杉 任羽卓 ZHUANG Jiachi;LUO Shan;REN Yuzhuo
机构地区:[1]中央财经大学社会与心理学院 [2]中国人民大学经济学院
出 处:《社会学评论》2025年第1期241-256,共16页Sociological Review of China
基 金:中央财经大学2024年教育教学改革基金项目、中央财经大学一流本科专业和课程建设项目。
摘 要:本文聚焦于外卖平台和网约车平台劳动者的劳动过程,探究平台劳动时间悖论的形成机制。研究发现,平台主要通过人效考核,管理、培训活动的无酬化和业余时间化,以及激励内嵌三个机制来延长平台劳动者的劳动时间。一方面,平台企业通过平台规则对劳动者进行直接考核、通过第三方机构协助监督管理,为了完成这些考核和监管任务,平台劳动者只能尽量延长在线工作时间以及利用休息时间进行额外的劳动;另一方面,平台将激励制度嵌入考核奖惩体系和系统派单程序,延伸了劳动者自由调整工作时间结构的弹性边界。不同类型的平台控制劳动时间机制的侧重点不同,但都出现了兼职劳动全职化现象,平台劳动者很难真正做到上班灵活,下班自由,也不可能实现下线即下班。This paper focuses on the labor processes of the workers on the food delivery and ride-hailing platforms,and exploves the formation mechanism of the platform labor time paradox.The findings reveal that platforms primarily ex⁃tend workers’labor time through three mechanisms:performance evaluation,the unpaid and leisure-time utilization for management and training activities,and embedded incentive systems.On the one hand,platforms directly evaluate work⁃ers through platform rules and delegate monitoring and management tasks to third-party agencies.To meet these evaluations and regulatory requirements,platform workers are compelled to extend their online working hours and use their rest time for additional labor.On the other hand,platforms integrate incen⁃tive systems into the evaluation and reward-punishment frameworks,as well as order-dispatching algorithms,thereby stretching the flexible boundaries of work⁃ers’ability to adjust their work schedules.Although the mechanisms for control⁃ling labor time vary across different types of platforms,a commonality is that un⁃der platform control,workers cannot truly achieve flexibility during working hours or freedom after clocking out.Logging off does not equate to ending work.
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